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Abstract 
In this thesis, we conduct experiments with human decision makers on supply 
chain  contracting.  We consider a simple manufacturer-retailer supply chain scenario 
where the retailer faces the newsvendor problem. Building on Sahin and Kaya (2011), 
we compare the experimental performance of three contract types (wholesale price, 
buyback and revenue sharing contracts) between the firms with theoretical predictions, 
and among each other. We are interested in the manufacturer’s contract parameter 
decisions, the retailer’s stock quantity decision, and the firms’ profits. In theory, in 
terms of supply chain efficiency, the buyback and revenue sharing contracts should be 
equivalent to each other, and should be superior to the wholesale price contract. Our 
experiments, however, find the wholesale price contract to perform better, and the 
revenue sharing contract to perform worse than theoretical predictions. The profit 
distribution between the firms is also much more equitable than predicted. The primary 
reason for these differences is the biases in retailers’ stock quantity decisions. We 
determine the factors that affect the retailer’s stock quantity decision using feature 
selection and classification techniques. Using a multiple regression model, we show 
how fairness concerns affect this decision. We also observe short-run relationships 
between the firms to cause better performance in experiments than long-run 
relationship, perhaps due to destructive gaming between the firms.                            
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Anahtar Kelimeler: tedarik zinciri yönetimi, sözleşme, gelir paylaşımı üzerinden 
sözleşme, davranışsal operasyon, deney, kararlarda yanlılık, adalet endişeleri 
 
Özet 
 
Bu tezde, tedarik zincirlerinde sözleşmeler konusunda gerçek insanlarla karar verme 
deneyleri gerçekleştirdik. Üreticinin sözleşmeyi önerdiği, perakendecinin de “gazeteci 
çocuk” problemi ile karşı karşıya kaldığı bir üretici-perakendeci tedarik zincirini ele 
aldık. Sahin ve Kaya (2011) in çalışmalarını da kullanarak üç sözleşme tipinin deneysel 
performanslarını  (satılmayan malların geri alımı üzerinden sözleşme,toptan satış fiyatı 
üzerinden sözleşme ve gelir paylaşımı üzerinden sözleşme) kuramsal tahminlerle 
karşılaştırdık. Üreticilerin kontrat parametreleri kararlarının, perakendecilerin stok 
miktarı kararlarının ve iki firmanın da karları üzerinde durduk. Kuramsal tahminler, 
gelir paylaşımı üzerinden sözleşme ve geri alım sözleşmesinin tedarik zinciri verimliliği 
bakımından eşit olması gerektiğini ve bu iki sözleşmenin toptan satış fiyatı üzerinden 
sözleşmeden daha iyi olduğunu söyler. Bizim deneylerimizde, aksine, toptan satış fiyatı 
üzerinden sözleşmenin kuramsal tahminlerden daha iyi, gelir paylaşımı üzerinden 
sözleşmenin ise kuramsal tahminlerden daha kötü sonuç verdiğini gördük. Firmalar 
arasındaki kar dağılımı beklenenden daha eşitti. Bu farklılıkların ana sebebi 
perakendecilerin stok miktarı kararlarındaki saplamardır. Perakendecilerin stok miktarı 
kararlarını etkileyen faktörleri özellik seçme ve sınıflandırma yöntemleriyle seçtik. 
Çoklu regresyon modeli kullanarak, adalet endişelerinin bu kararı nasıl etkilediğine 
baktık. Bir diğer önemli sonuç ise beklentilerin aksine, üretici-perakendeci ilişkisinin 
kısa vadeli olduğu deneylerde, uzun vadeli deneylere göre daha yüksek tedarik zinciri 
karı elde edilmesi oldu. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As a result of the outsourcing trend, most products today are produced and delivered to 
consumers through global supply chains. This vertically disintegrated structure brings 
certain efficiency benefits compared to a vertically integrated structure (i.e., a single 
firm). However, at the same time, it introduces the need for “coordination” between the 
chain members: Each firm in the supply chain aim to maximize its own profit, which 
can cause conflicts of interest with the other chain members.  
 
A particular coordination issue is observed in supply chains that face uncertain demand 
for their end product. The problem of matching supply with demand, which is already 
difficult for a single firm, becomes even more difficult when it involves multiple firms 
in the chain. Firms often under produce or overproduce due to misaligned incentives, 
causing not only low profits but also unsatisfied customers.  
 
Due to its importance for practice, a large number of operations management 
researchers have been studying the issue of supply chain coordination (See, for example 
Cachon 2003, and Kaya and Ozer 2010). These studies focus on the “contract”, which, 
by defining the rules of engagement, determines how the profit and risk will be shared 
between the firms. A well-crafted contract can mitigate the inefficiency in the supply 
chain by aligning the incentives of the chain members. In fact, it is possible to achieve 
total coordination within the chain, i.e., single integrated firm performance, by choosing 
the right contract parameters.  
 
To study contracting in the presence of uncertain demand, most studies in literature 
consider a simple game-theoretical manufacturer-retailer supply chain model where the 
retailer faces the well known newsvendor problem. The manufacturer acts first by 
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offering a contract, and hence, determines the overage and underage parameters of the 
retailer’s problem. The model is solved with backwards induction. First, the retailer’s 
optimal stock quantity for a given contract is found using the newsvendor formulation. 
Then, the manufacturer’s optimal contract parameters are calculated, assuming that the 
retailer will set the newsvendor stock quantity.  
 
Aforementioned analytical models are based on the economic assumption that human 
beings “aim to maximize only their own benefit and are perfect infallible decision 
makers who have the information and cognitive capability to always choose the best 
option among alternatives”. These assumptions have been challenged by a high number 
of experimental studies with human decision makers. Researchers have observed 
systematic deviations between model predictions and experiment data (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). In fact, theoretical models’ inability to 
explain and predict human behavior has caused a significant gap between supply chain 
contracting research and practice.  
 
The assumptions in theoretical models can be categorized into those related to 
individual decision making, and those related to the strategic interaction between two 
decision makers. The theoretical models make the following two assumptions about 
how human beings (including firms’ managers) make decisions: 
 
 The decision maker aims to maximize his expected utility level. On the contrary, 
experiments have shown that human beings have other factors in their objective 
function. They exhibit, for example, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion and regret 
aversion.   
 
 The decision-maker is rational. That is, he can collect all relevant information, 
and he has the cognitive ability to choose the best option among alternatives. On 
the contrary, human beings do not use all relevant information, their cognitive 
abilities are not that high, and they often resort to satisfying solutions rather than 
optimizing.  
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In addition to these, there are the following assumptions from game theory, related to 
the strategic interaction between two firms: 
 
 The decision maker does not care about the utility level of the decision makers 
with which he interacts. On the contrary, experiments have shown that human 
beings care about others’ utility in a positive or negative way. Decisions indicate 
signs of altruism, fairness, trust and reciprocity factors (Fehr, Klein and Schmidt 
1999). Social factors such as status and group membership are also effective 
(Loch and Wu 2008). 
 
Such findings indicate the need to be careful when using theoretical results in studying 
supply chain contracting.  
 
In this thesis, we conduct experiments with human subjects based on the simple 
manufacturer-retailer supply chain model. We study the following three well-known 
supply chain contracts between the firms.   
 
 Wholesale price contract (w): This contract has only one parameter, the wholesale 
price. This denotes the price at which the retailer buys the manufacturer’s product. 
Because it has only one parameter, the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate 
the supply chain.  
 
 Buyback contract (w,b): In a buyback contract, in addition to the wholesale price 
w, the manufacturer also determines the buyback price, b, at which he buys back 
unsold units from retailer. According to theory, the buyback contract can achieve 
supply chain coordination with a proper combination (w,b). Buyback contracts (or 
returns policies) have been widely used in textile, fashion, publishing, 
pharmaceuticals and computer software and hardware industries (Padmanabhan and 
Png 1995, Wang and Webster 2009). Around 30% of new hardcover books are 
returned to the publishers by booksellers (Chopra and Meindl 2007).  
 
 Revenue sharing contract (w,r): In revenue sharing contract, the manufacturer sets 
a lower wholesale price w, and gains a share of revenue, r, from each unit that the 
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retailer sells to customers. According to theory, the revenue sharing contract can 
achieve supply chain coordination with proper combination of (w,r). Revenue 
sharing contract is reported to be used in video rental industry (See Cachon and 
Lariviere 2005). 
 
The experiments on the wholesale price and buyback contracts were conducted as part 
of a prior thesis study: Sahin and Kaya (2011). This thesis work adds the revenue 
sharing contract experiments, and further analysis to answer the following research 
questions: 
 Are the results in revenue sharing contract experiments in line with theoretical 
predictions?  
 How does the experimental performance of the revenue sharing contract 
compare with the wholesale price and buyback contracts? In theory, the revenue 
sharing contract is equivalent to the buyback contract, and it is superior to the 
wholesale price contract in terms of contract efficiency.  
 What factors may be effective in the retailer’s stock quantity decision deviation 
from the predicted quantities? Using Weka software, we develop a feature 
selection and classification method to understand whether subjects consider 
some factors more than others. 
 What is the role of “fairness” factor in retailer’s decisions? We measure fairness 
as the ratio of expected profit of retailer to manufacturer for an offered contract, 
and develop regression models. 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we present the related 
literature. In Chapter 3, we discuss our simple manufacturer-retailer supply chain 
model, and present its theoretical solution. In Chapter 4, we present the experimental 
design and procedure. In Chapter 5, we report the results of our experiments. Chapter 6 
presents our feature selection and classification study. In chapter 7, we discuss fairness 
concerns. In Chapter 8, we conclude with discussions and future research suggestions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
We consider a simple supply chain composed of a manufacturer and retailer, where the 
manufacturer’s contract determines the retailer’s newsvendor problem parameters. We 
present the relevant literature in three categories. We first present the literature on the 
newsvendor problem. We then discuss the literature on supply chain coordination, and 
finally we focus on the literature on the fairness factor. Within each subcategory, we 
discuss both theoretical and experimental/behavioral studies.  
 
2.1. Literature on the Newsvendor Problem  
Newsvendor problem is about a newsboy who has to determine the number of copies of 
a particular magazine to buy before facing stochastic consumer demand. If demand 
turns out to be higher than the newsvendor’s order quantity (underage situation), the 
difference becomes lost sales, and the newsvendor loses the opportunity to profit from 
these sales. If demand turns out to be lower than the newsvendor’s order quantity 
(overage situation), the difference becomes leftover units. The only decision is this 
single-period problem is the newsvendor’s order quantity. Arrow et al. (1951) come up 
with the famous “critical ratio” solution to the problem. This solution resolves the trade-
off between ordering too much and ordering too little by considering the demand 
distribution and the relative costs of underage and overage. 
 
A common assumption in the newsvendor model is that the newsvendor will act 
optimally to maximize his expected profit. The missing link in the analytical modeling 
literature is the question of whether decision-makers do order optimally, and if not, then 
how to induce the optimal ordering behavior. Empirical studies have shown that 
decision makers don’t behave according to what theory assumes. Corbett and Fransoo 
(2007) report a survey on how entrepreneurs and small businesses make their inventory 
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decisions. These decisions are found to be partly consistent with the newsvendor model. 
For high margin products, entrepreneurs and small businesses behave according to the 
newsvendor model, but not for their best selling products. The respondents behave 
according to prospect theory: they are risk averse for profits and risk seeking for losses. 
 
Economists have been conducting controlled laboratory experiments to figure out 
human decision makers’ decision processes (Kagel and Roth 1995). They observe that 
human decision makers are prone to decision errors instead of behaving rationally. The 
use of experimental methods in operations management have increased rapidly in the 
last years, leading to the emergence of the “behavioral operations management” field 
(Bendoly et al. 2006, Gino and Pisano 2008). 
 
The first laboratory experiment about newsvendor problem was conducted by 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000). These authors observed that, in high profit condition 
(where the critical ratio is above 0.5), subjects’ average order quantity is less than the 
optimum order quantity; and in low profit condition (where the critical ratio is below 
0.5) subjects’ average order quantity is higher than the optimum order quantity. 
Schweitzer and Cachon refer to this observation as the “pull to center” effect, because in 
both cases, experimental order decisions are “pulled” towards the mean of the demand 
distribution, away from the optimal newsvendor quantities.  The authors show that the 
pull to center effect cannot be explained consistently in both high and low margin 
conditions with a number of possible causes, such as risk aversion, loss aversion or 
stockout aversion. Instead, Schweitzer and Cachon show that the effect can be explained 
by the following three heuristics: 
 Mean anchor heuristic implies anchoring on mean demand, and insufficiently 
adjusting towards the optimum order quantity.  
 Chasing demand heuristic implies anchoring on the previous order quantity, 
and adjusting towards the previous demand realization.  
 Minimizing ex–post inventory error heuristic implies regretting from not 
ordering the previous round’s demand realization even it was not the optimal 
decision ex-ante.  
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Bolton and Katok (2008) also observe pull to center effect in their experiments that 
consists of three different studies. In first study, they limit the number of ordering 
options from 100 to 9 and 3 respectively, and conclude that limiting the number of 
ordering options does not improve performance for both high and low profit conditions. 
In the second study, they provide information about the foregone decisions, but tracking 
the foregone options does not help improve performance. In the third study, the authors 
force subjects to place ten-period standing orders, and they conclude that with standing 
orders the subjects learn over time by taking long term decisions rather than focusing on 
short term decisions.  
 
Benzion et al. (2008) study both uniform demand distribution and normal demand 
distribution in a newsvendor model. The authors observe that subjects biases towards 
the mean demand diminishes over time and the orders are affected from previous 
demand realization. Bostian et al. (2008) explain the pull to  center effect with an 
adaptive learning model that considers memory, reinforcement and probabilistic choice 
factors. They conclude that subjects learn the attractiveness of each order quantity over 
time based on their past round experiences. Lurie and Swaminathan (2009) show that 
more frequent feedback does not always improve performance.  
 
The observed decision biases may stem from individual decision making of the subject, 
or due to strategic decision making between the subjects. Some of the most important 
individual decision biases studied in the literature are as follows.   
 
 Risk aversion and Loss aversion: A risk averse decision maker orders less than 
the optimum order quantity while a risk seeking decision maker orders more than 
optimal (Eeckhoudt et al. 1995). Loss averse people tend to avoid situations where 
probabilities are unknown (uncertainty about uncertainty), and order less than the 
optimum order quantity, because losses result in larger disutility than the value 
derived from the same size of gains (Camerer and Weber 1992). Wang and Webster 
(2006) show that when shortage cost is low, a loss averse decision maker orders less 
than a rational decision maker. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) analyze the 
psychophysical determinants of risk aversion and risk seeking.  
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 Framing: Framing, which is related to prospect theory, describes how the subjects 
decide whether they are facing a loss or a gain. Shultz et al. (2007) conduct 
experiments to show what kind of framing could trigger better decisions in the 
newsvendor model. High margin and low margin situations, and positive and 
negative frames are analyzed. In the positive frame, the gain is emphasized, whereas 
in the negative frame loss is emphasized. Their experiments find no difference 
between the positive and negative frames, and no learning effect. Ho and Zhang 
(2008) analyze whether fixed fee affects nonlinear pricing contracts. They conclude 
that the fixed fee fails in improving channel efficiency, and that quantity discount 
contract does better than two part tariff contract, although these two contracts are 
equivalent in theory. In addition, they show that channel efficiency decreases when 
loss aversion coefficient increases.  
 
 Bounded Rationality: Standard economic theory assumes a perfectly rational 
decision maker. However, human beings are only boundedly rational (Simon 1982). 
Su (2008) indicates that pull to center effect can be explained by bounded 
rationality using a quantal response equilibrium framework. The author concludes 
that subjects don’t always make the best decision, but the good decisions are more 
likely to be chosen rather than the bad ones. Gaverneni and Isen (2008) use verbal 
protocol analysis to understand the logic behind the decision makers’ decisions in 
the newsvendor game. They argue that most subjects were successful in calculating 
underage and overage costs but failed to transform them into optimum order 
quantity. This study examines subjects’ decisions individually, and emphasizes the 
possible misunderstandings due to use of aggregate data. 
 
 Irrational Behavior: Becker-Peth et al. (2011) show that human subjects’ orders in 
an experiment can be predicted accurately even when the subjects are irrational. 
The authors derive response functions for mean orders, variance of orders and 
expected profit to predict actual human behavior. They show that contrary to 
theory, the order quantity not only depends on the critical ratio but also wholesale 
price and buyback price. In addition, the authors use these response functions 
instead of the standard newsvendor model to design supply chain contracts. 
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 Overconfidence: An overconfident decision maker estimates a lower demand 
variance than the true variance. Croson et al. (2008) show that overconfident 
decision makers make suboptimal decisions. The authors suggest to managers 
different ways to incentivize overconfident newsvendors. Bolton et al. (2008) show 
the difference between managers and students when playing the newsvendor game. 
The authors compare the performance of three subject types: undergraduate 
students, master students and managers. They conclude that managers don’t 
perform better than two student groups. Graduate students, in particular, are better 
in using the given information that helps find the optimum solution.  
 
 Cultural differences: Experiments have shown that cultural differences affect 
decision making process. Feng et al. (2010) conduct newsvendor experiments to 
analyze the cross–national differences between Chinese and American subjects. 
Chinese subjects’ decisions are found to be more anchored to mean demand than 
American subjects. The authors also examine “thinning set of orders” approach of 
Bolton and Katok (2008). When the optimum order is one of the middle options 
rather than the extreme one, supply chain efficiency and the percentage of choice of 
the optimum order quantity increases. Cui et al. (2011) replicate Gavirneni and Isen 
(2010)’s thought process study with Chinese students. Chinese students are found to 
be more adept at dealing with uncertainties by asking questions, probably due to 
higher uncertainty aversion.  
 
 Gender Differences: Vericourt et al. (2011) investigate the effect of gender 
differences in newsvendor game. Using DOSPERT scale, these authors find  that in 
low profit condition, there is no significant difference between males and females, 
but in high profit condition, males are more risk seeking. Males tend to set higher 
quantity than females in high-margin settings due to being less risk averse. 
 
 
2.2.  Literature on Supply Chain Coordination  
Supply chain contracting and coordination literature has developed analytical models 
for many different contract types between supply chain members. In this study, in 
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addition to the simple wholesale price contract, we study the buyback and revenue 
sharing contracts.  
 
Tsay (1999) analyzes the quantity flexibility contract where retailer commits to order 
minimum amount of order quantity, and manufacturer guarantees a maximum supply 
level. Taylor (2002) studies the channel rebate contract. In a linear rebate contract, the 
manufacturer pays a rebate to the retailer for every unit sold to end customers, whereas 
in a target rebate contract manufacturer pays a rebate to retailer when the amount that is 
sold to end customers is beyond a threshold level. Taylor concludes that when demand 
is independent from retailer’s sales effort, a linear rebate contract can achieve channel 
coordination, but it cannot achieve coordination otherwise. Tomlin (2003) shows that a 
quantity premium contract in a supplier-manufacturer chain can be highly efficient since 
it helps a supplier invest in more capacity. 
 
Pasternack (1985) was the first to show that a buyback contract can coordinate a supply 
chain. He argues that if the manufacturer allows only partial returns, the selling price 
and return policy is a function of retailer’s order quantity; but if the manufacturer can 
buy back all unsold units (unlimited return policy) then the return policy is independent 
from retailer’s order quantity decision. There are also examples in literature in which 
the retailer determines both quantity and price at the same time. For example, Emmons 
and Gilbert (1998) analyzes return policies to figure out what combination of wholesale 
price and return policy maximizes manufacturer’s expected profit. The retailer price 
increases with increased uncertainty, and the manufacturer gain more profit with buying 
back unsold units from retailer. Kandel (1996) studies different types of contracts that 
try to allocate the risk between manufacturer and retailer for the unsold inventory. Two 
extreme contracts are consignment contract and no return contract. The author  shows 
that manufacturers prefer consignment contracts, where retailers prefer no return 
contract.  
 
Next, we outline the experimental/behavioral work on supply chain contracting. In this 
thesis, we use Keser and Paleologo (2004)’s parameter setting as our base model. These 
authors only study the wholesale price. They do not study long versus short relations 
between the firms as well. In their experiments, the average wholesale price is observed 
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to be lower than optimum, and the retailers order less than the newsvendor quantity. No 
evidence is found to support Schweitzer and Cachon’s pull to center effect and chasing 
demand heuristic. Supplier’s realized profit is lower than expected, and retailer’s 
realized profit is higher than expected, which implies more equally allocated profits.  
 
Similar to us, Katok and Wu (2009) conducts laboratory experiments to compare 
wholesale price, buyback and revenue sharing contracts. Different from our 
experiments, the subjects in these authors experiments play against computerized 
opponents, rather than playing against each other. Revenue sharing and buyback 
contracts are observed to perform better than the wholesale price contract, but fail to 
achieve channel coordination. Retailers’ decisions are more likely to show minimizing 
ex post inventory error than anchoring and insufficiently adjustment heuristic. The 
difference between buyback and revenue sharing contracts that stem from framing of 
contract types diminish over time. 
 
Lim and Ho (2007) test the effect of the number of blocks in a contract. They observed 
that two block tariff contract helps increase supply chain efficiency more than linear 
price contract, but the increase in efficiency is lower than expected. If the blocks rise to 
three, the supply chain efficiency goes further, and the manufacturer’s profit share 
increases. The authors propose a Quantal-Response Equilibrium (QRE) model to 
explain the retailer’s sensitivity to counterfactual profits. Haruvy et al. (2011) compare 
coordinating contracts such as two part tariff (TPT) and minimum order quantity 
(MOQ) to wholesale price contract. They also compare the efficiency of structured and 
ultimatum bargaining processes.  
 
Hyndman et al. (2012) analyze the difference between fixed and random matching in 
coordination games. Fixed matching setting is similar to our long-run experiments, and 
the random match is similar to our short run experiments. The efficiency of fixed match 
where is found to be higher in initial periods, but the situation gets reversed at the last 
five periods of the game. This is explained by the “first impression bias”.  
 
By definition, a supply chain consists of multiple decision makers that interact with 
each other strategically. This interaction is modeled using game theory in literature, 
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however, real human beings do not exactly interact as predicted by game theory. 
Humans, for example, are influenced by social preferences. Social preferences refer to 
concerns about the other firm’s welfare, reciprocity stem from positive relationship, and 
desire of a higher relative payoff compared to the other firm when the status is salient. 
Loch and Wu (2008) designed an experiment in which they try to figure out social 
preferences and their impact on supply chain coordination. Customer demand is a 
function of manufacturer’s and retailer’s selling prices. The authors develop three 
different experimental conditions as the “control condition” in which players are given 
simple incentives only, “relationship condition” in which both parties are assumed to 
have a friendship, and status “seeking condition” in which players are assumed to 
compete with each other. In relationship condition, both parties are observed to set 
prices lower than optimum, and in status seeking condition, both parties set selling 
prices higher than optimum. 
 
In the following subsection, we outline the literature on another important factor related 
to strategic interaction, “fairness”, for which we present a regression study.   
 
 
2.3. Literature on the Fairness Factor 
Research in behavioral economics in the past two decades has shown that “there is a 
significant incidence of cases in which firms, like individuals, are motivated by 
concerns of fairness” in business relationships, including channel relationships 
(Kahneman et al. 1986). Studies in economics and marketing have long documented 
cases where fairness plays an important role in developing and maintaining channel 
relationships (See, for example, Okun 1981, Kaufmann and Stern 1988, Geyskens et al. 
1998, Corsten and Kumar 2005). For instance, through a large-scale survey of car 
dealerships in the United States and Netherlands, Kumar et al. (1995) show that fairness 
is a significant determinant of the quality of channel relationships. Subsequent research 
has also documented cases where both manufacturers and retailers sacrifice their own 
margins for the benefit of their counterpart because of fairness concerns (Olmstead and 
Rhode 1985).  
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Bowles et al. (1997) show that without rationality, unrelated individuals can earn 
something with reciprocal behavior in repeated games. They investigate how a change 
in density of social interaction affects cooperation rates. Cultural differences affect 
reciprocal fairness and environmental differences affect the way the subjects play the 
game. Falk et al. (2000) show that in domain of both positively and negatively 
reciprocal behavior, fairness intention is important. The authors examine fairness as a 
possible explanation of conflict. They observe that in ultimatum game, subjects make 
higher offers just because of the rejection risk. Fehr and Gachter (2000) also show that 
reciprocity and fairness have strong implications in economics. Fehr and Schmidt 
(2005) argue that people have other-regarding parameters rather than being self 
interested, that make them care about the other’s decisions. In their experiments, they 
observe both self interested people who don’t care the other’s welfare as well as other-
regarding people. 
 
Fairness factor has recently been studied in supply chain literature as well. Cui et al. 
(2007) show that when members of supply chain are fair enough, supply chain 
coordination can be achieved with simple wholesale price contract. Fehr et al. (2007) 
investigates how fairness concerns affect contract parameters. They show that bonus 
contracts cannot work well when all parties are selfish. However, when they care about 
fairness, the firms choose superior bonus contracts rather than incentive contracts. 
Katok and Pavlov (2009) study an analytical model that focuses on retailer’s contract 
acceptance and rejections. The authors show that if the supplier knows the retailers’ 
fairness concern level, he can coordinate the supply chain, on the other hand, when 
retailer’s fairness concern is a private information, the supplier cannot coordinate the 
chain. Demirag et al. (2010) analyze nonlinear demand functions such as exponential, 
constant elasticity, algebraic and logit demand. They show that a wholesale price 
contract can coordinate supply chain when only the retailer, or both the manufacturer 
and retailer are concerned about fairness.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
3. ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section, we first present the simple two-firm supply chain setting that we 
consider, and outline our solution methodology. We then discuss the solution of the 
integrated supply chain scenario, which provides us with a benchmark. Next, we present 
the solutions of the disintegrated supply chain under three contract types that we study. 
These solutions correspond to the “theoretical predictions” to which we compare our 
experimental observations.  
 
 
3.1. The Supply Chain Scenario 
We consider a manufacturer who produces a certain product, and a retailer who buys the 
product from the manufacturer and sells it to consumers at a sales price of p. Consumer 
demand is probabilistic with cdf F(.). Products that are unsold to consumers during the 
sales season has zero value.  
 
 
Figure 3.1.1: The Basic Supply Chain 
 
We consider a three-stage game (strategic interaction) between the manufacturer and the 
retailer: 
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Stage-1: The manufacturer determines the contract parameters and offers the contract to 
the retailer. One of the contract parameters is the wholesale price, w. This is the price at 
which the manufacturer sells his product to the retailer. Depending on the contract type, 
the contract may include other parameters. 
 
Stage-2: The retailer accepts the contract if it provides him with positive expected 
profit, and rejects it otherwise. If the retailer rejects the contract, the interaction ends 
and both firms obtain zero profit. If the retailer accepts the contract, he determines his 
stock quantity Q for the product and orders these units from the manufacturer. This is 
the only ordering opportunity for the retailer. The manufacturer produces this order by 
incurring a unit production cost c per product, and delivers the units to the retailer. The 
retailer stocks these products prior to the selling season.  
 
Stage-3:  Random consumer demand is realized as “D”. Using his stock of product, the 
retailer satisfies this demand as much as possible. The sales quantity of the retailer is 
the minimum of his stock quantity Q and the realized demand. Two cases are possible: 
 If demand is higher than retailer’s stock quantity (i.e., D>Q), then retailer will 
sell all Q units, and (D-Q) units of demand will be unsatisfied (unsatisfied 
demand). Unsatisfied demand causes no other penalty other than the lost profit 
margin.  
 If demand is less than the retailer’s stock quantity, (i.e., D<Q), then the retailer 
will sell D units, and (Q-D) products will be unsold (leftover products). These 
products have zero salvage value.  
 
Each firm makes decisions to maximize its’ own expected profit in the game. 
Expectation is with respect to the random consumer demand. Note the strategic 
interaction between two firms: The expected profit of each firm depends not only on its 
own decision, but also on the other firm’s decision and also on the random demand. By 
offering the contract, the manufacturer makes the first move in this sequential game, 
and the retailer follows with his stock quantity decision (which can be Q=0 in case of 
contract rejection). To conduct a focused study on contractual incentives, we ignore 
certain operational (lead times, manufacturer capacity etc.) and strategic (contract 
negotiations etc.) details in the model.  
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The Theoretical Solution 
The theoretical solution, i.e., the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, for this sequential 
game can be determined using backwards induction. First, one determines the retailer’s 
optimal stock quantity at stage 2 for any given contract offer. The retailer faces the well-
known newsvendor problem where the solution follows the famous critical solution 
formula    𝑄∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡   =   𝐹−1   
𝑐𝑢
𝑐𝑢 +𝑐𝑜
 .  Here, the costs of underage and depend on 
the manufacturer’s contract offer. This formula solves the trade-off between 
overordering and underordering by considering monetary terms as well as the demand 
distribution.  
 
Next, using Q*(contract), one determines the optimal contract parameters of the 
manufacturer at stage 1. Similar to standard game-theoretical models, the manufacturer 
is assumed to foresee the retailer’s Q*(contract) choice for any contract offer. That is, 
the manufacturer can solve the retailer’s problem. Taking the retailer’s Q*(contract) 
reaction into account, the manufacturer determines the contract parameters that 
maximize his own expected profit.  
 
The manufacturer’s objective function is in general not jointly concave in the contract 
parameters. Hence, one cannot find a closed form solution for the manufacturer’s 
problem. Instead, one can use a numeric procedure to determine the manufacturer’s 
optimal contract parameters through a grid search over possible parameter 
combinations. Using these contract parameters, one can then calculate the retailer’s 
stock quantity, expected sales quantity, and the expected profits of the two firms. These 
values characterize the outcome of the game for the given values of model parameters. 
  
 
3.2. Integrated Supply Chain Solution 
Before characterizing the solutions under different contract types, we first determine the 
integrated supply chain solution which provides an efficiency benchmark. In this 
scenario, a single decision maker makes all decisions with the objective of maximizing 
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the total supply chain (manufacturer + retailer) expected profit. In business practice, this 
scenario reflects an integrated firm that owns both the manufacturer and the retailer. 
The supply chain’s problem is formulated as 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝜋𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑠𝑐  𝑄 = 𝑝𝐸[min 𝑄, 𝐷 ] −  𝑐𝑄 . 
 
This is also a newsvendor problem. Note that the contract parameters are not relevant 
for the supply chain’s problem. The stock quantity that maximizes the supply chain’s 
expected profit is: 
 
𝑄𝑠𝑐 = 𝐹−1   
𝑐𝑢
𝑐𝑢 +𝑐𝑜
 = 𝐹−1   
𝑝−𝑐
𝑝
 . 
(1) 
The supply chain’s expected profit with stock quantity Qsc is equal to 
 
𝜋𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑠𝑐  𝑄𝑠𝑐 = 𝑝𝐸[min 𝑄𝑠𝑐 , 𝐷 ] –  𝑐𝑄𝑠𝑐 .  
(2)     
In this thesis, we study decentralized supply chains where the manufacturer and the 
retailer are two independent firms. Such decentralized decision making by two separate 
firms result in inefficiencies because each firm considers only its own profit margin in 
making decisions, not the total supply chain profit margin. This is known as the “double 
marginalization’ problem (Spengler 1950).  
 
The maximum total expected profit achievable in a decentralized supply chain under 
any contract is given by the level in Equation (2. This is referred to as the integrated 
firm profit. The ratio of the total expected profit level under a contract to integrated firm 
profit is known as contract efficiency. A contract that achieves 100% efficiency is said 
to be coordinating the supply chain. In this case, the incentives of the firms are aligned, 
and inefficiencies due to double marginalization are eliminated. Coordination requires 
the retailer to choose the integrated firm stock quantity Q
sc
. Any other stock quantity 
choice will cause suboptimal total expected profit level in the supply chain.  
 
Q 
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While the retailer’s stock quantity decision determines the total supply chain profit, the 
manufacturer’s contract parameter decision has three roles: 
 
 Inducing the retailer’s Q choice: Manufacturer’s contract parameters affect the 
retailer’s stock quantity Q choice through the newsvendor formula. If the 
contract parameters satisfy certain conditions, they may cause the retailer to 
choose Q
sc
, achieving coordination. The manufacturer, however, aims to 
maximize his own profit rather than maximizing the total supply chain profit.  
 
 Profit sharing: The contract parameters determine how the total profit will be 
shared (in expectation) between the two firms. For example, a high wholesale 
price increases the manufacturer’s expected profit share at the expense of the 
retailer’s share.   
 
 Risk sharing: The retailer faces underage/overage risk due to probabilistic 
consumer demand. The contract parameters in the buyback and revenue sharing 
contracts determine how much of this risk is shared by the manufacturer.   
 
We present the theoretical solution for a given customer demand distribution with cdf 
F(.). In our experiments, consumer demand is Uniformly distributed between 
(𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 , 𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 ). For this distribution, one can further characterize the optimal stock 
quantity of the retailer as  
 
𝑄𝑠𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 =    
𝑐𝑢
𝑐𝑢 +𝑐𝑜
 ∗  𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛  +  𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 . 
 
 
3.3. Solution under Wholesale Price Contract (WSP)  
This contract has only one parameter, the wholesale price value w. Given the contract 
(w), the retailer’s problem is 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝜋𝑟
𝑤 (𝑄) = 𝑝𝐸[min 𝑄, 𝐷 ] −  𝑤𝑄. 
Q 
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The retailer’s optimal stock quantity satisfies 
 
𝑄𝑤   𝑤 = 𝐹−1  
𝑝 − 𝑐
𝑝
 . 
(3) 
Comparing Equations 1 and (3, we observe that the wholesale price contract cannot 
coordinate the supply chain unless the manufacturer sets w=c. Such a choice is unlikely 
because it yields zero expected profit to the manufacturer. Having only one parameter, 
this contract type fails to align the incentives of the two firms.  
 
For uniformly distributed demand, the unique stock quantity solution becomes 
 
𝑄𝑤 𝑤 =   
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 −
𝑤 𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 −𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛  
𝑝
   𝑖𝑓 𝑤 < 𝑝
                     0                   𝑖𝑓 𝑤 ≥ 𝑝
    . 
 
Substituting Q
w
(w), the manufacturer’s problem becomes 
 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝜋𝑚
𝑤 =  w − c  Qw  . 
 
The objective function of the manufacturer is quadratic and concave in the interval 
[𝑐, 𝑝] and is equal to zero if w>p. Manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price is found as  
 
 𝑤𝑤 = min  𝑝,   
𝑐
2
+  
𝑝
2
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 −𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛
 . 
 
In the subgame perfect solution of the game, the manufacturer offers the wholesale price 
w
w
 and the retailer’s stock quantity becomes  
 
𝑄𝑤 𝑤𝑤 =  
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥
2
−  𝑐  
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛
2𝑝
 . 
 
w 
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3.4. Solution under Revenue Sharing (RS) Contract  
Under a revenue sharing contract (w,r), the retailer pays the manufacturer a revenue 
share r per unit sold to customers, in addition to the standard wholesale price he pays 
per unit he orders. Under this contract, the manufacturer usually offers a lower 
wholesale price compared to a wholesale price contract because he also charges the 
retailer for units sold to customers.  The retailer’s problem becomes 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝜋𝑟
𝑟𝑠(𝑄) = (𝑝 − 𝑟)𝐸[min 𝑄, 𝐷 ] − 𝑤𝑄. 
 
Under the revenue sharing contract (w,r),  the retailer’s cost of underage becomes  p-w-r 
while the cost of overage is w. The retailer’s optimal stock quantity is: 
 
𝑄𝑟𝑠 𝑤, 𝑟   =   𝐹−1   
𝑐𝑢
𝑐𝑢 +𝑐𝑜
   =   𝐹−1   
𝑝−𝑤−𝑟
𝑝−𝑟
 .  
                                                                                                         (4) 
 
 
Comparing Equations (1 and (4, one can show that the supply chain will be coordinated 
if the revenue sharing contract parameters satisfy  r =  p(c − w)/c.  However, recall 
that the manufacturer’s objective is to maximize his own expected profit rather than 
supply chain coordination. Substituting 𝑄𝑟𝑠 𝑤, 𝑟 , the manufacturer’s problem becomes 
 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝜋𝑚
𝑟𝑠 =  𝑤 − 𝑐 𝑄𝑟𝑠 + 𝑟𝐸[𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑟𝑠 , 𝐷 ]. 
   
 
3.5. Solution under Buyback (BB) Contract  
With this contract, the manufacturer buys back unsold units from the retailer at the end 
of the sales season by paying a buyback price b per unit. By buying back unsold units, 
the manufacturer reduces the retailer’s cost of overage, encouraging the retailer to set a 
higher stock (order) quantity.  The retailer’s problem becomes 
 
Q 
 
w, r 
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𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝜋𝑟
𝑏 = 𝑝𝐸[min 𝑄, 𝐷 ] + 𝑏𝐸[𝑄 − min⁡(𝑄, 𝐷)] −  𝑤𝑄 
    =   𝑝 − 𝑏 𝐸[min 𝑄, 𝐷 ] −   𝑤 − 𝑏 𝑄. 
    
Under the buyback contract (w,b),  the retailer’s cost of overage becomes w-b while the 
cost of underage is p-w. The retailer’s optimal stock quantity is found as: 
 
                                       𝑄𝑏 𝑤, 𝑏   =   𝐹−1   
𝑐𝑢
𝑐𝑢 +𝑐𝑜
   =   𝐹−1   
𝑝−𝑤
𝑝−𝑏
 .  
(5)                       
Comparing Equations 1 and (5, one can show that the supply chain will be coordinated 
if the buyback contract parameters satisfy  𝑏 =  
𝑝 𝑤+𝑐 
𝑝−𝑐
.   
 
Substituting Q
b
(w,b), the manufacturer’s problem becomes 
 
                 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝜋𝑚
𝑏 =  𝑤 − 𝑐 𝑄𝑏 − 𝑏𝐸[𝑄𝑏 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑏 , 𝐷 ]. 
 
 
 
3.6. The Solutions under Our Parameter Setting 
We consider the following model parameter values:  
 Unit production cost, 𝑐 = 50. 
 Retail price, 𝑝 = 250. 
 Demand uniformly distributed between 40 and 230, and can take only integer 
values. 
 All decision variables are integers.  
 
This parameter setting is the same as the one used by Keser and Paleologo (2004). 
Given these parameters, the manufacturer’s wholesale price satisfies 0 ≤ 𝑤 < 𝑝 = 250.  
For a given w, the revenue share price in an RS contract satisfies 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 250 −  𝑤. 
Likewise, the buyback price in a BB contract satisfies   0 ≤ 𝑏 ≤ 𝑤. 
Q 
w, b 
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The subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions under the three contracts are summarized in 
Table 3.6.1 below. 
 
Table 3.6.1: Solutions Under the Three Contracts 
Type of 
Contract 
Total 
Profit 
Contract 
Efficiency 
Mfg. 
Profit 
Retailer 
Profit 
w b r Q 
Wholesale Price 17,137 74.00% 12,126 5,011 176 -- -- 96 
Revenue Share 23,117 98.50% 22,784 333 1 -- 246 183 
Buyback 23,117 98.50% 22,784 333 247 246 -- 183 
 
 
We observe the manufacturer’s optimal solution under the buyback and revenue sharing 
contracts to dominate the solution under wholesale price contract in terms of total 
profits. This is primarily due to differences between the retailer’s stock quantities. In 
fact, the efficiencies of the buyback contract and revenue sharing contracts are close to 
100%, which is good news from the supply chain point of view. However, the profit 
distributions under these contracts are quite unbalanced. Almost all profit is going to 
manufacturer. The wholesale price contract, on the other hand, while inefficient, offers 
the retailer a decent profit level.  
 
Note that these theoretical results assume that  
1. The retailer will accept any contract that provides him with nonzero expected 
profit; 
2. The retailer will determine his stock quantity according to the newsvendor 
formula; 
3. The manufacturer will be able to foresee the retailer’s stock quantity choice and 
choose contract parameters accordingly;  
4. Each firm’s objective is to maximize its own expected profit.  
 
As we will discuss in our experimental study, these assumptions are questionable when 
real human beings make decisions.   
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CHAPTER 4 
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
In this chapter we present our experimental design and experiment procedure. We also 
briefly summarize our approach to data analysis. 
  
4.1. Experimental Design 
This study involves 14 experimental sessions. Each experiment consists of 30 
independent periods. In each period, the supply chain scenario described in Section 3.1 
is played between two human subjects that play the roles of manufacturer and retailer.  
 
The experimental design is illustrated in Table 4.1.1, where n denotes the number of 
subjects. We study three different contract types (wholesale price, revenue sharing and 
buyback contracts) and two relationship length types (long run and short run). In long 
run experiments, the same manufacturer-retailer pair interacts throughout all 30 periods, 
whereas in short run experiments, the pairs are re-determined in each period.  
 
Table 4.1.1: Experimental Design and Number of Subjects 
 
  
                              Contract Type 
 
 
  
Buyback Wholesale price Revenue Sharing 
R
el
a
ti
o
n
sh
ip
 L
en
g
th
 
L
o
n
g
 r
u
n
 
Experiment b1a, n=12 
Experiment b1b, n=16 
Experiment w1a, n=16 
Experiment w1b, n=16 
Experiment w1c, n=16 
Experiment r1a, n=12 
Experiment r1b, n=16 
S
h
o
rt
 r
u
n
 
Experiment b2a, n=12 
Experiment b2b, n=16 
Experiment w2a, n=16 
Experiment w2b, n=16 
Experiment w2c, n=16 
Experiment r2a, n=12 
Experiment r2b, n=16 
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The wholesale price and buyback experiments reported in this thesis were conducted 
before, and were already reported in Sahin and Kaya (2011). This thesis extends Sahin 
and Kaya’s work by adding the revenue sharing contract experiments, by comparing RS 
contract experiment data with other contracts, and by presenting further analyses on all 
three contracts’ data.  
 
Next, we explain the experimental procedure using the revenue sharing contract 
experiments as an example. The wholesale price and buyback contract experiment 
procedures are similar. 
 
 
4.2. Experimental Procedure (Revenue Sharing Experiments) 
Our experiments are computer-based and were conducted at the CAFE (Center for 
Applied Finance Education) computer laboratory of Sabancı University, Faculty of 
Management. This laboratory, which contains 24 dual-screen connected computers, 
serves as an interactive classroom for the University’s graduate program in finance. The 
experimental model was coded using a special-purpose script language, HP MUMS. 
Part of the experiment code is provided in Appendix A as a sample.  
The experiment was announced to the Spring 2012/2013 semester students of Sabancı 
University course MS 401. These students had already studied the basic newsvendor 
problem. Interested students were recruited through an online application system. To 
provide incentive for experiment attendance and to induce motivated decisions, each 
subject was given a grade bonus proportional to his/her total profit in the experiment. 
The bonus grade ranged between 1% and 2.5%, and it was applied to MS 401 course 
final grade of the student. 
 
The subjects were given detailed instructions a couple of days before the experiment. 
Sample instructions are provided in Appendix B. Upon arrival to the lab, the subjects 
were seated randomly in the lab. Next, an experimenter explained the scenario and the 
software interface on the blackboard to ensure that the instructions are clearly 
understood, and answered any remaining questions of the subjects. Before starting the 
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actual experiment, the subjects played through three training periods using the 
experiment interface. These periods data were not recorded. Finally, the real 
experimental session, which took around two hours, began. The subjects were 
prohibited from communication during the experiment. Separators were installed at the 
edges of screens to isolate subjects from each other. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment, the server computer assigns each subject the role of 
either manufacturer or retailer. The role of a subject stays unchanged throughout the 
experiment. The server then randomly matches the subjects to form manufacturer-
retailer pairs. These pairs stay fixed in “long run relationship” type experiments, 
whereas the pairs are re-determined in each period in “short run relationship” type 
experiments.  
 
Each pair plays the supply chain scenario for 30 periods (rounds). The periods are 
independent of each other. Inventory is not carried from one period to the other, and 
demand values are not correlated.  In each period, the following sequence of events take 
place, in accordance with our supply chain scenario: 
 Each manufacturer determines contract parameters and submits these decisions 
to the server computer by entering these into relevant boxes in his screen. A 
sample manufacturer screen is provided in Figure 4.2.1. 
 After the server receives all manufacturers’ contract decisions, it transmits each 
manufacturer’s decisions to his retailer pair’s screen. 
 Observing the contract parameters, the retailer determines his stock (order) 
quantity and submits this decision to the server. The manufacturer is assumed to 
produce and deliver these units to the retailer prior to the selling season. The 
retailer may reject the contract by submitting zero quantity. Figure 4.2.2 
provides a sample retailer screen. 
 The server randomly determines the random consumer demand realization for 
each pair. Depending on this realization, the sales, leftover quantities and lost 
sale quantities, as well as profit realizations are calculated. These values are 
reported to pairs. In fact, the subjects can access their all past periods’ results at 
any point during the experiment using the historical results screen given in 
Figure. 
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 The server records all results and proceeds to the following period.  
 
Each subject is given around 40 seconds to make his decision in every period. This 
duration was longer in the initial periods to allow experimentation. As seen in Figure 
4.2.1 and Figure 4.2.2, we provide a “decision support tool” (the table in the middle of 
the screen) to help subjects make decisions. By using this tool, the subjects could run 
what-if analysis before submitting their decisions. A retailer subject can enter a stock 
quantity to this tool and obtain the outcome for eight different realizations of the 
stochastic consumer demand (For D = 40, 70, 100, 130, 160, 190, 220, 230). The 
manufacturer also has a decision support tool. However, he needs to enter contract 
parameters (w, r), as well as a value for the retailer’s stock quantity decision to the tool. 
More detailed explanation about the decision support tool can be found in Appendix B 
where we provide the instructions. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.1: Sample Manufacturer Screen 
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Figure 4.2.2: Sample Retailer Screen 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.3: Sample Historical Results Screen 
 
 
4.3. Experimental Data Analysis 
Recall that the outcome of a game is shaped by first the manufacturer’s decision, second 
the retailer’s decision and third the realization of random consumer demand. We use the 
following terms to differentiate the predictions at different levels: 
 
1) Manufacturer’s optimal outcome: This corresponds to the subgame-perfect 
equilibrium of the model as explained in Section 3.4. In this outcome, the 
manufacturer offers the contract (w
rs
=1, r
rs
=246), and the retailer stocks the 
corresponding newsvendor quantity Q
rs
(w
rs
,r
rs
) = 183.  Manufacturer’s expected 
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profit is 22,784 and retailer’s expected profit is 333. This is what the theory 
predicts as the outcome of the overall interaction between the two firms in any 
given period. 
2) Newsvendor prediction (predicted outcome): In experiments, manufacturers 
often do not set optimal contract parameters (w
rs
,r
rs). We define the “predicted 
outcome” as the expected outcome of the game given any contract (w, r) choice 
by the manufacturer, assuming that the retailer orders the newsvendor stock 
quantity Q
rs
(w, r).  
3) Expected outcome: Retailer subjects also often deviate from the newsvendor 
stock quantity decision. For any contract (w,r) and retailer’s response Q(w,r), the 
“Expected outcome” denotes the expected result with respect to consumer 
demand distribution.  
 
In our analyses, we compare these prediction values to realized (observed) 
outcome. This is the observed experimental data based on the two firms’ decisions 
and a particular realization of consumer demand.   
 
The main unit of analysis we use is the period averages across manufacturer-retailer 
pairs. Hence, each experiment yields 30 data points. For some experiments, we also 
report analyses on subject-level data. Consistent with the literature, we exclude rejected 
contract decisions from the main analysis. The information about the rejected contracts 
are provided separately. Appendix C provides the summary results with and without 
rejected contracts.  
 
We do not have prior assumptions on the distributions of the assessed variables; 
therefore we used non-parametric statistical tests (Siegel, 1956) such as the Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank test and the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test (the Mann-Whitney U test) to test 
statistical significance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5. RESULTS 
In this chapter, we present the results of our experimental study and compare the results 
with theoretical predictions. We first make an overall comparison with respect to 
contract type and relationship length. These comparisons complement the ones reported 
in Sahin and Kaya (2011) by providing the revenue sharing experiment results. Next, 
we present detailed analyses on one long run (r1b) and one short-run (r2b) relationship 
revenue sharing contract experiment sessions.  
 
5.1. Overall Comparison Results 
Here, we compare experimental results to understand the effects of relationship length 
and the contract type. The unit of analysis is the mean value in a period across all games 
(i.e., manufacturer-retailer pairs) in a given experiment. Hence, each experiment yields 
the same number of data points as its number of periods. To obtain strong results, we 
pooled the data of similar experiments together. For example, by pooling the data of 
Experiments b1a and b1b, we obtain 60 data points for b1 experiments. Table 5.1.1 
summarizes the comparison. We exclude the data of the games where the contract is 
rejected. 
Table 5.1.1: Experimental Design 
  
Contract Type 
  
Buyback 
 (BB) 
Wholesale Price 
(WSP) 
Revenue Sharing 
(RS) 
R
el
a
ti
o
n
sh
ip
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en
g
th
 
L
o
n
g
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u
n
 
b1 experiments w1 experiments r1 experiments 
60 data points 90 data points 56 data points 
S
h
o
rt
 R
u
n
 
b2 experiments w2 experiments r2 experiments 
60 data points 90 data points 60 data points 
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In what follows, we first discuss the results of the revenue sharing contract experiments. 
We compare the data with the manufacturer’s optimal solution. Then, we compare the 
long and short run relationship results. Next, compare the results of revenue sharing 
contract experiments with wholesale price contract and buyback contract experiments.   
 
 
5.1.1. Revenue Sharing Contract Experiments 
Table 5.1.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the revenue sharing contract 
experiments.  Bold p-values represent the results with significant median differences 
according to Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. 
 
Table 5.1.2: Comparison of Revenue Sharing Experiments  
Revenue 
Sharing 
Mfg. 
Optimal  
Revenue 
Sharing All 
(n=116) 
p - value 
Long Run 
(r1, n=56) 
Short Run 
(r2, n=60) 
p - value 
Total Profit 
23,117 Mean 18207 
0.000 
17834 18496 
0.507 
 
Median 18275 18120 18345 
 
Std 3156 3211 3108 
Mfg. Profit 
22,784 Mean 11711 
0.000 
11500 11944 
0.505 
 
Median 11395 11376 11420 
 
Std 2036 1934 2162 
Retailer 
Profit 
333 Mean 6497 
0.000 
6335 6553 
0.918 
 
Median 6760 6570 6679 
 
Std 2314 2641 1957 
Retailer 
Predicted 
Profit 
333 Mean 7479 
0.000 
7370 7674 
0.003 
 
Median 7384 7036 7722 
 
Std 1106 1797 1844 
w 
1 Mean 101 
0.000 
108 90 
0.000 
 
Median 103 109 85 
 
Std 17 19 24 
r 
246 Mean 66 
0.000 
58 75 
0.010 
 
Median 64 57 82 
 
Std 20 16 27 
Q  
Mean 117 
0.000 
113 128 
0.000 183 Median 116 114 127 
 
Std 26 35 39 
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Recall that the theoretical predicted outcome of the interaction is the manufacturer’s 
optimal solution that we outlined in Chapter 3. First, we would like to know if 
experimental data is in line with this solution.   
 
HYPOTHESIS-1 (THEORETICAL BENCHMARK, REVENUE SHARING CONTRACT):  
The outcome of the interaction will be as described by the manufacturer’s optimal 
solution. Specifically, w=1, r=246, Q=183 with a total profit of 23,117, where the 
manufacturer gains 22,784 and the retailer gains 333. 
 
Experiment data strongly rejects this hypothesis. Instead of offering the optimal contract 
which provides only a tiny profit to the retailers, the manufacturers offered much more 
acceptable contracts that yield a decent profit level to the retailers. These contracts had 
lower revenue share price, and much higher wholesale prices than the manufacturer’s 
optimal solution. Retailer’s stock quantities are much lower than those in the optimal 
solution. Total profit level, which depends on the retailer’s stock quantity, is also well 
below the one in the optimal solution. Yet, this profit is more equitably shared between 
the manufacturer and the retailer. 
 
Next, we study the effects of relationship length by comparing the long-run (i.e., fixed 
partner) experiments with short-run (i.e., variable partner) experiments. We expect 
higher profit levels for both firms in a long-run relationship. In these experiments, each 
partner knows that he will be playing with the other partner in all of the 30 periods. The 
partners are likely to get to know each other over time
1
 and may develop collaborative 
strategies. The manufacturer should be offering more attractive contracts, and the 
retailer should be stocking higher quantities in response. In short-run relationship 
experiments, both partners know that the relationship is one-shot and that the pairs are 
re-determined randomly in each period. Hence, we expect the partners to act more 
myopically, leading to opportunistic behavior. 
 
                                                          
 
1
 Note that players are not allowed to communicate during experiments.  
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HYPOTHESIS-2 (LENGTH OF RELATIONSHIP, REVENUE SHARING CONTRACT): 
Profit levels (retailer, manufacturer, total) will be higher under a long-run relationship 
than those under a short-run relationship.  
 
Experimental data rejects this hypothesis. Surprisingly, although not significant, the 
total profit, manufacturer’s profit and retailer’s profit are all higher in the short run 
relationships. We observe the manufacturers to offer more attractive contracts in terms 
of retailer’s predicted profit in the short-run relationships, probably due to the fear of 
rejection by the “unknown” retailer. This leads to higher stock quantities, which is 
preferable from the supply chain point of view. Another explanation is that the subjects 
engaged in destructive “strategic gaming” in the long-run relationships. To obtain 
higher profits in the long run, they may be making aggressive decisions (manufacturers 
offering unattractive contracts, and/or retailers frequently rejecting contracts) in the 
initial periods to “signal” that they are tough players. 
 
 
5.1.2. Comparing the Revenue Sharing and Wholesale Price Contract Experiments 
Here we compare the experimental performances of the revenue sharing and wholesale 
price contracts. Based on supply chain contracting literature, we expect the revenue 
sharing contract to achieve higher total supply chain profit than the wholesale price 
contract. Also, we expect the manufacturer’s profit to be higher under the revenue 
sharing contract. This is because the manufacturer is the one who offers contract 
parameters, and the wholesale price contract is only a special case of the revenue 
sharing contract with 𝑟 = 0. 
HYPOTHESIS-3 (RS-WSP CONTRACT COMPARISON): (3a) Total profit and (3b) the 
manufacturer’s profit will be higher under the revenue sharing contract than under the 
wholesale price contract.  
 
Table 5.1.3 provides descriptive statistics for the comparison.  
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Table 5.1.3: Comparison of the Revenue Sharing Contract Experiments with the 
Wholesale Price Contract Experiments  
 
Mfg.'s Optimal Solution Experiment Data 
 
Revenue 
Sharing  
WSP  
 
Revenue 
Sharing All 
(n=116) 
Wholesale 
Price All 
(n=180) 
p - value 
Total 
Profit 
23,117 17,137 Mean 18,207 19,120 
0.016 
 
 
Median 18,275 19,132 
 
 
Std 3,156 2,895 
Efficiency 
98.5% 73.7% Mean 78.7% 82.4% 
0.000 
 
 
Median 79.0% 82.4% 
 
 
Std 13.6% 3.0% 
Mfg  Profit 
22,784 12,126 Mean 11,711 12,349 
0.000 
 
 
Median 11,395 12,299 
 
 
Std 2,036 1,364 
Retailer 
Profit 
333 5,011 Mean 6,497 6,770 
0.377 
 
 
Median 6,760 6,778 
 
 
Std 2,314 2,990 
Retailer 
Predicted 
Profit 
333 5,011 Mean 7,479 7,511 
0.990 
 
 
Median 7,384 7,426 
 
 
Std 1,106 1,069 
Q 
183 96 Mean 117 125 
0.000   
 
Median 116 124 
  
 
Std 26 15 
 
Experiment data rejects Hyphothesis-3a. Contrary to expectation, the total profit under 
the revenue sharing contract is significantly lower than that under the wholesale price 
contract. This finding is interesting because the revenue sharing contract holds the 
potential to coordinate the supply chain, whereas the wholesale price contract is known 
to be inefficient in theory. Recall that in our parameter setting, the revenue sharing 
contract is coordinating when Q
sc
=192, with a total supply chain profit of 23,280. The 
manufacturer’s optimal solution with the revenue sharing contract yields a total profit of 
23,117, which is quite close to the total profit under coordination. If the manufacturer 
offered his optimal revenue sharing contract to a rational retailer (i.e., a computerized 
retailer), the outcome would be quite efficient. However, human retailers would 
probably reject a contract that offers an expected profit of only 333. Hence, it is 
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understandable that this contract is not offered. However, the manufacturer does not 
offer revenue sharing contracts that have high contract efficiency at all. The average 
efficiency of the revenue sharing contracts in experiments is around 79%. 
In theory, the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain unless 𝑤 =
𝑐 = 50, which is not likely to be offered by the manufacturers. In fact, the average 
efficiency of the wholesale price contracts in our experiments is 82.4%, which is much 
higher than the theoretical predicted value of 73.4%. Our results support Wu (2013), 
and Katok and Wu (2009) in reporting that wholesale price contract to performs better 
than theoretical prediction.  
The results are the same for Hypothesis 3b. We observe the revenue sharing contract to 
decrease both manufacturer’s and retailer’s (not significantly) profits. Our results 
contradict Katok and Wu (2009)’s results. In their experiments however, only one 
partner is human, and the other is computerized. Hence, the difference in observations is 
probably due to the existence of “strategic interaction” between two human players. Our 
results imply that the findings of one-sided experiments should be used with caution 
when there is strategic interaction between parties.  
Finally, as Table  5.1.4 illustrates, directional comparisons between the wholesale price 
and revenue sharing contracts are robust if one compares the long run and short run 
experiments separately. Some of the differences, however, are not significant any more.  
5.1.3  Comparing the Revenue Sharing and Buyback Contract Experiments 
Here we compare the experimental performances of the revenue sharing and buyback 
contracts. Based on supply chain contracting literature, we expect the two contracts to 
be equivalent. Table 5.1.5 provides descriptive statistics for the comparison. 
 
HYPOTHESIS-4 (RS-BB CONTRACT COMPARISON): (4a) Total profit and (4b) the 
manufacturer’s profit will be the same in the revenue sharing contract and the buyback  
contract.  
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Table  5.1.4: Comparison of Long-Run and Short-Run Relationship Experiments 
Between Revenue Sharing and Wholesale Price Contracts 
 
 
Long Run Relationship Short Run Relationship 
 
  
Revenue 
Sharing 
(n=56) 
Wholesale 
Price 
(n=90) 
p - value   
Revenue 
Sharing 
(n=60) 
Wholesale 
Price  
(n=90) 
p - value 
Total 
Profit 
Mean 17,834 18,455 
0.375 
Mean 18,496 19,784 
0.007 Median 18,120 18,347 Median 18,345 19,881 
Std 3,221 2,612 Std 3,108 3,023 
Efficiency 
Mean 77.1% 81.85% 
0.015 
Mean 80.0% 83.0% 
0.003 Median 78.3% 81.57% Median 79.3% 83.4% 
Std 13.8% 2.76% Std 13.4% 3.08% 
Mfg  
Profit 
Mean 11,500 12,134 
0.039 
Mean 11,944 12,565 
0.000 Median 11,376 11,912 Median 11,420 12,598 
Std 1,934 1,443 Std 2,162 1,251 
Retailer 
Profit 
Mean 6,335 6,322 
0.902 
Mean 6,553 7,219 
0.165 Median 6,570 6,289 Median 6,679 7,482 
Std 2,641 2,702 Std 1,957 3,204 
Retailer 
Predicted 
Profit 
Mean 7,239 7,298 
0.883 
Mean 7,703 7,724 
0.900 Median 7,095 7,144 Median 7,550 7,770 
Std 1,025 958 Std 1,139 1,136 
Q 
Mean 105 119 
0.000 
Mean 128 131 
0.081 Median 102 118 Median 125 131 
Std 20 14 Std 26 13 
 
Experiment data rejects both Hyphothesis-4a and Hypothesis 4b. Buyback contract 
performs better than the revenue sharing contract. Yet, note that the efficiency of  both 
contracts are far less than the theoretical prediction. Under the revenue sharing contract, 
the manufacturers profit is significantly lower, but the retailer’s profit is significantly 
higher than the buyback contract. As indicated by the retailer’s predicted profit 
comparison, the manufacturers offer more favorable contracts under the RS contract. 
However, the retailers responded with lower stock quantities. The poor performance of 
the revenue sharing contract may be due to its “framing”. The revenue sharing contract 
requires the retailer to “share” his revenue with the manufacturer, whereas the buyback 
contract provides safety against unsold items. The retailers may prefer the buyback 
contract even when the revenue sharing contract offers higher expected profits.  
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Table 5.1.5: Comparison of the Revenue Sharing Experiments with the Buyback 
Contract Experiments  
 
Mfg.'s Optimal Solution Experiment Data 
 
Revenue 
Sharing  
Buyback  
 
Revenue 
Sharing All 
(n=116) 
Buyback 
All (n=120) 
p - value 
Total Profit 
23,117 23,117 Mean 18,207 19,010 
0.000 
  
Median 18,275 18,873 
  
Std 3,156 3,386 
Efficiency 
98.5% 98.5% Mean 78.7% 81.8% 
0.000 
  
Median 79.0% 81.2% 
  
Std 13.6% 14.5% 
Mfg  Profit 
22,784 22,784 Mean 11,711 13,788 
0.000 
  
Median 11,395 13,815 
  
Std 2,036 1,104 
Retailer 
Profit 
333 333 Mean 6,497 5,714 
0.016 
  
Median 6,760 5,657 
  
Std 2,314 2,765 
Retailer 
Predicted 
Profit 
333 333 Mean 7,479 6,143 
0.000 
  
Median 7,384 6,030 
  
Std 1,106 1,129 
Q 
183 183 Mean 117 127 
0.000 
  
Median 116 127 
  
Std 26 14 
 
This result contradicts Wu (2013), who conducted 100-round long run relationship 
experiments under wholesale price, revenue sharing and buyback contract experiments. 
She found no significant difference between buyback and revenue sharing contracts in 
the initial periods of the interaction, but some difference in the latter periods.  
As Table 5.1.6 illustrates, the comparisons we make between the two contract types are 
robust if one focuses only on the  long-run relationship experiments. If one considers 
short-run experiments only, the differences between the stock quantities and retailer 
profits become insignificant.  
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Table 5.1.6 Comparison of the Long Run and Short Run Relationship Experiments 
Between Revenue Sharing and Buyback Contracts 
  Long Run Relationship Short Run Relationship 
  
  
Revenue 
Sharing 
(n=56) 
Buyback 
(n=60) 
p - value   
Revenue 
Sharing 
(n=60) 
Buyback 
(n=60) 
p - value 
Total Profit 
Mean 17,834 18,697 
0.017 
Mean 18,496 19,323 
0.008 Median 18,120 18,585 Median 18,345 19,076 
Std 3,211 3,419 Std 3,108 3,351 
Efficiency 
Mean 77.1% 80.5% 
0.023 
Mean 80.0% 83.2% 
0.013 Median 78.3% 80.0% Median 79.3% 82.1% 
Std 13.8% 14.7% Std 13.4% 14.4% 
Mfg  Profit 
Mean 11,500 14,267 
0.000 
Mean 11,711 13,309 
0.000 Median 11,376 14,489 Median 11,395 13,247 
Std 1,934 1,276 Std 2,036 604 
Retailer 
Profit 
Mean 6,335 4,983 
0.004 
Mean 6,497 6,444 
0.738 Median 6,570 4,697 Median 6760 6,529 
Std 2,641 2,663 Std 2314 2,692 
Retailer 
Predicted 
Profit 
Mean 7,239 5,414 
0.000 
Mean 7,703 6,872 
0.000 Median 7,095 5,251 Median 7,550 6,808 
Std 1,025 791 Std 1,139 929 
Q 
Mean 105 125 
0.000 
Mean 128 129 
0.280 Median 102 125 Median 125 129 
Std 20 15 Std 26 14 
 
 
5.2. Experiment r1b Results (Long run interaction) 
Experiment r1b is one of the long-run interaction experiments under revenue sharing 
contract. It has seven manufacturer-retailer pairs. Contract rejection is observed in 24 
games.  
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5.2.1  Retailer’s Stock Quantity Decision and Firms Profits 
Here, we discuss the retailer’s stock quantity decision and the firms’ profits. We 
compare experimental data with theoretical prediction (based on retailer’s newsvendor 
quantity for the given contract parameters) in each game.  
 
Figure 5.2.1(a)-(c) present the mean stock quantity and the firms’ profits across seven 
games over 30 periods. Table 5.2.1 summarizes the comparison.  
 
 
       
 
 
Figure 5.2.1: (a)-(c) Stock Quantity and Firms Profits in Experiment r1b 
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We observe that stock quantity is lower than predicted. Retailer’s profit and 
manufacturer’s profit is also significantly lower than the predicted values.  
 
Table 5.2.1: Stock Quantity and Profits in Experiment r1b 
 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer's Profit Manufacturer's Profit 
  Data Predicted p value Data Predicted p value Data Predicted p value 
Mean 108 124   4978 6970   11224 12986   
Median  105 124 0.002 4824 6830 0.000 10536 13067 0.002 
St. Dev.  21 4   2204 513   
2237 327 
  
 
Next, we study the subject-level results to gain a more detailed understanding  
 
Table 5.2.2 presents the results by manufacturer-retailer pairs. We observe 
heterogeneous behavior: Four retailers significantly understock, whereas three retailers 
overstocked, two significantly. Hence, one should be cautious in using average results 
to describe subject behavior.   
 
Table 5.2.2.(a)-(c) Stock Quantity Decisions and Firms’ Profits in Experiment r1b 
Stock Quantity 
Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Ret  4 Ret 5 Ret  6 Ret 7 
Mean Data 138 131 112 121 135 100 107 
Median Data 140 129 113 120 140 110 120 
Pred. Q*(w,r) 156 91 151 100 125 127 137 
p value 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.241 0.000 0.001 
 
 
 
Retailer Profit Ret 1 Ret 2 Ret 3 Ret 4 Ret  5 Ret 6 Ret 7 
Mean Data 9269 3036 5654 3634 3848 6895 8101 
Median Data 10450 4635 5920 7000 3800 5050 9050 
Stdev 6361 6647 3029 6575 4687 5646 5425 
Pred. Profit 10765 3315 7000 4963 4921 8827 9171 
p value 0.597 0.304 0.090 0.139 0.230 0.472 1.000 
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Mfg. Profit Mfg 1 Mfg 2 Mfg 3 Mfg 4 Mfg 5 Mfg 6 Mfg 7 
Mean Data 10153 18041 11303 14516 14441 9105 9418 
Median Data 9500 17240 11950 14400 13230 9920 10241 
Stdev 3039 5353 3016 2820 6062 3305 2740 
Pred. Profit 11558 12879 14836 12725 15067 11703 11997 
p value 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.415 0.000 0.002 
 
 
Retailers obtained lower profits than the predicted values on average. This is an 
expected outcome because any deviation from the newsvendor quantity reduces the 
retailer’s expected profit. The reduction; however, is not found to be significant. This is 
mainly due to the existence of the revenue share term: We observe the manufacturer’s 
profit to be significantly higher than predicted when the retailer overstocked, and 
significantly lower than predicted when the retailer understocked.  
 
Figure 5.2.2(a)-(f) presents the stock quantities and profit levels for the seven pairs 
separately over time. We observe the individual retailer behavior to be highly variable. 
Some retailers (such as Retailer-1) consistently stocked high quantities, whereas some 
(such as Retailer-6) stocked low. We observe how the retailer’s profit variance increases 
with his stock quantity. Setting a high stock quantity means taking risk: The retailer 
may win or lose a lot, increasing his profit variance. Retailers 2 and 4, ended up losing 
money in some games. Retailer-2 made loss in six games, averaging $7,170. Retailer-4 
made loss in nine games, averaging $5,443. These losses explain the difference between 
Retailer 2 and 4’s mean and median profit levels. Pair-2 is worth analyzed. It seems that 
manufacturer offers contract parameters that give much of the profit to himself. 
Retailer-2 orders reasonable stock quantity as a reply that results high profits to 
manufacturer and low (sometimes negative) profit to Retailer-2. The situation with 
Retailer-1 is rather different. This retailer was offered very attractive contract terms, 
ordered high quantities, and made high profits without much risk. Her partner, 
manufacturer-1, paid the price of offering generous contract terms with his own profit. 
The total profit is proportional to the retailer’s stock quantity. Pairs in which the retailer 
stocked low quantities ended up making low total profits.  
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5.2.2  Manufacturer’s Contract Parameter Decisions 
Here we study the manufacturer’s contract parameter (w, r) decisions. Recall that the 
contract parameters determine the critical ratio (which determines the newsvendor 
quantity) and the retailer’s expected profit, which is a proxy for contract attractiveness. 
Figure 5.2.3 (a)-(d) illustrates the mean values of manufacturer’s contract parameters, 
implied critical ratio and retailer’s predicted profit. Table 5.2.3 summarizes the mean 
values. 
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Figure 5.2.2 (a)-(f) Stock Quantities and Profit Levels for the Seven Pairs                                  
in Experiment r1b 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.3 (a)-(d) Contract Parameters, Critical Ratio and Retailer’s Predicted Profit                       
in Experiment r1b 
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Table 5.2.3: Contract Parameters in Experiment r1b 
 
Wholesale 
Price 
Revenue Share 
Price 
Critical Ratio 
Retailer’s 
Predicted 
Profit 
Mfg. Optimal 1 246 0.75 333 
Mean Data 103 67 0.44 6971 
Median Data 104 66 0.44 6830 
Stdev Data 4,7 6,38 0.01 514 
 
We observe that on average, the manufactures choose much higher wholesale prices and 
much lower revenue share prices than the ones in their theoretical optimal solution. 
Manufacturer-level decisions presented in Table 5.2.4 also confirm this behavior.  
 
 
Table 5.2.4 Manufacturer-level Decisions in Experiment r1b 
 
Mfg. 
Optimal 
Mfg.-1 Mfg.-2 Mfg.-3 Mfg.-4 Mfg.-5 Mfg.-6 Mfg.-7 
Wholesale 
Price w 
1 69 145 56 149 75 124 105 
Revenue 
Share Price r 
246 74 51 120 29 114 23 60 
 
 
Figure 5.2.4(a)-(b) below illustrates the retailer’s expected profit (i.e., contract 
attractiveness) over time for all seven pairs. We observe that Manufacturer-1 offered 
very attractive contract terms, which lead to high stock quantities and high profits for 
Retailer-1. Due to the high wholesale price and revenue share price setting of 
Manufacturer-2, predicted profit of Retailer-2 is quite low. Retailer-7’s predicted profit 
jumps up and down, due to changes in manufacturer’s contract parameter decisions. 
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Figure 5.2.4. (a)-(b) Retailer’s Expected Profit in Experiment r1b 
 
Why did the manufacturers not offer their theoretical optimal contract, but offered much 
higher wholesale price and much lower revenue share price values that lead to higher 
expected profit to the retailer? Possible reasons include the following: 
 
  Making the necessary calculations: Theory assumes that the manufacturers will 
be able to make the related calculations and foresee the expected outcome for every 
contract they may offer. However, human beings are boundedly rational and they 
have limited cognitive abilities. Although the decision-support-tool on their screens 
provides assistance, the subjects may not be able to make these calculations. In 
particular, determining two contract parameters together may be a difficult task for 
the manufacturers. 
 
 Risk- and loss-averse retailers: Theory assumes that the retailer will accept any 
contract that provides her with a non-negative expected profit. In addition, the 
theoretical calculations assume a risk-neutral retailer. However, human beings are 
risk averse and hence, they need to be compensated when they make decisions under 
risk. In addition, they are loss averse: They weight losses more heavily than gains in 
their mind. Hence, a contract that provides only a small positive expected profit may 
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not be accepted by the retailer. Knowing this, the manufacturer may be offering a 
more attractive contract to the retailer. 
 
 Fairness: The theoretical optimal solution provides only 1.5% of the total profit to 
the retailer, and 98.5% to the manufacturer. Human beings are known to be averse 
to “unfairness”. In particular, the retailers are not likely to accept such a contract 
that proposes a very unfair share of profits. The manufacturer himself may not also 
enjoy being “unfair” to the retailer. Hence, he offers contracts that propose a more 
equitable sharing of profits.  
 
 Fear of contract rejection: Recall that although the manufacturer enjoys the first-
mover advantage in the game, the retailer can reject the contract by ordering zero 
units, and cause both firms to gain zero profits. That is, the retailer has vetoing 
power in the game. Although we observe contract rejection only in ten games out of 
180, (a retailer that rejects 12 contracts out of 30 period game is excluded) the fear 
of rejection is likely to keep the manufacturer from offering unattractive contracts.   
 
5.2.3  Changes in Decisions over Time 
Next, we aim to understand if and how the subjects’ decisions change over time 
perhaps, due to learning. To do so, we segment the time horizon into three to compare 
the results in the initial ten periods with the results in the last ten periods. Table 5.2.5 
presents the average-over-subjects results. The p-values of Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 
are provided in the bottom row of the table.  
  
Table 5.2.5: Mean Values in Three Period Blocks in Experiment r1b 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer Profit Mfg. Profit 
Wholesale 
Price 
Revenue Share  Critical Ratio 
Per. 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Pred. 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Pred. 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Pred. 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
Mean 
Data 
Median 
Data 
1-10 110 111 124 5513 5064 7143 11532 11240 12810 104 105 66 65 0.44 0.44 
10-20 119 120 125 4721 4825 6848 12540 12883 13070 104 105 65 66 0.44 0.44 
21-30 95 94 123 4701 4633 6922 9600 9888 13080 102 100 71 69 0.44 0.44 
p value 0.125 0.360 0.123 0.980 0.432 0.995 
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We observe that overall, subjects do not seem to learn from experience. There is no 
consistent improvement in profits from the initial periods to the final ones. In fact, both 
retailer and manufacturer profits seem to decrease.  
 
Next we look into the subject-level results given in Table 5.2.6 to gain a deeper 
understanding. Again, we observe serious level of intra-subject variation. Hence, one 
should be careful in interpreting the average-over-retailer type results in the literature, 
including ours.  
 
Table 5.2.6 Subject-level Changes over Time in Experiment r1b 
 
Period Pair-1 Pair-2 Pair-3 Pair-4 Pair-5 Pair-6 
Q 1-10 144 110 130 120 130 127 
 
11-20 139 158 111 117 155 90 
 
21-30 138 102 118 112 104 76 
 
p-value 0.969 0.069 0.623 0.130 0.464 0.060 
Retailer 1-10 11137 4645 6316 2277 3624 6471 
Profit 11-20 7380 47 6251 4800 4577 7366 
 
21-30 9204 4417 4394 3849 3375 6449 
 
p-value 0.212 0.969 0.186 0.791 0.961 0.885 
Mfg. 1-10 11563 18461 10430 14933 14402 10929 
Profit 11-20 9071 21758 13024 14251 16698 8434 
 
21-30 9572 13904 10456 14346 10911 7042 
 
p-value 0.121 0.045 0.791 0.850 0.406 0.112 
Retailer 1-10 10332 3485 8182 5814 5207 8888 
Predicted 11-20 10725 3240 6322 5290 5219 8488 
Profit 21-30 11139 3973 6964 4560 4790 7626 
 
p-value 0.140 0.405 0.212 0.003 0.405 0.121 
w 1-10 78 149 62 144 79 120 
 
11-20 67 148 55 149 72 127 
 
21-30 60 143 49 152 67 111 
 
p-value 0.053 0.496 0.130 0.003 0.273 0.256 
r 1-10 65 51 104 27 109 25 
 
11-20 75 51 127 27 116 21 
 
21-30 81 50 130 32 104 19 
 
p-value 0.082 0.520 0.003 0.112 0.344 0.623 
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Pair-1, Pair-2, Pair-5 and Pair-6 do not seem to learn from experience. Retailer’s 
predicted profit decreased over time in Pair-4, since manufacturer increased wholesale 
price through the end of the game. Manufacturer-3 increased the revenue share price 
over time, but this does not affect retailer’s profit significantly because the wholesale 
price is decreased as well.   
 
5.2.4  Rejected Contracts 
There are twenty four games (out of 210) where the retailers rejected the contract by 
setting zero stock quantity. Fourteen of the rejected contracts are from one single 
retailer, Retailer-7.Table 5.2.7 provides the details.   
Table 5.2.7.Rejected Contracts with Predicted Results in Experiment r1b 
Period of 
Rejection 
Retailer 
Number 
w r Q* 
Mfg's Predicted 
Profit 
Retailer's 
Predicted Profit 
1 4 150 30 101 12,767 4,892 
19 5 100 90 112 14,362 4,519 
25 5 40 150 154 16,412 5,808 
27 5 50 140 144 16,135 5,495 
29 5 100 80 118 14,072 5,517 
2 6 130 125 121 12,197 7,583 
3 6 120 30 127 12,044 8,291 
13 6 130 20 123 11,899 8,102 
20 6 125 25 125 11,972 8,195 
28 6 120 30 127 12,044 8,291 
1 7 120 120 55 10,305 468 
2 7 90 90 124 14,359 5,690 
4 7 60 160 104 15,860 2,140 
6 7 100 100 104 14,434 3,567 
10 7 120 40 122 12,655 7,239 
14 7 100 50 135 12,307 8,725 
17 7 100 47 137 12,076 9,059 
22 7 101 47 136 12,143 8,923 
23 7 100 47 137 12,076 9,059 
24 7 100 46 137 11,997 9,035 
25 7 200 46 44 8,568 165 
26 7 150 46 91 12,872 3,498 
27 7 100 150 40 8,000 0 
28 7 150 50 88 12,823 3,169 
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Retailers are more likely to reject contracts that provide them low predicted profit, 
which is not surprising. However, all of the rejected contracts would theoretically result 
in nonnegative profit for the retailer. By rejecting such a contract, the retailer gave up an 
expected positive profit. In particular, Retailer-7 rejected quite generous contracts. Risk 
aversion may explain this behavior. Although the contract provides positive expected 
profit, losses are also possible which causes risk for the retailer.  
 
 
5.3. Experiment r2b Results (Short-run Interaction) 
Experiment r2b is one of the short-run interaction experiments under revenue sharing 
contract. It has six manufacturer-retailer pairs. Contract rejection is observed in only 1 
game.  
 
5.3.1 Retailer’s Stock Quantity Decision and Firms’ Profits 
Figure 5.3.1 (a)-(c) present the mean stock quantity and the firms’ profits across six 
games over 30 periods.Table 5.3.1 summarizes the comparison.   
We observe that retailers on average stocked lower than the predicted quantities, which 
is consistent with Experiment r1b. However, the difference between data and predicted 
values is quite small compared to Experiment r1b. We cannot speak of a significant 
understocking in this experiment. However, we observe from Figure 5.3.1(a) that the 
retailers understocked in the initial periods, but overstocked in the latter ones.  
 
With these stock quantities, retailers obtained lower profits than predicted. However, the 
difference is not significant. Although the mean stock quantity is close to the mean 
predicted value, there exist variations in individual decisions over periods, which cause 
reduction in profit. Recall that all deviations from the predicted (newsvendor) quantity 
lead to reduction in retailer’s expected profit. We observe that manufacturer’s profit is 
lower than his predicted profit, particularly in the earlier periods where the retailer 
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understocks. However, in latter periods manufacturers’ profit increases towards to the 
optimal value. This is because the manufacturers start offering less attractive contracts, 
but retailers keep increasing their stock quantity.  
 
    
 
Figure 5.3.1 (a)-(c) Stock Quantity and Firms Profits in Experiment r2b 
 
Table 5.3.1: Stock Quantity and Profits in Experiment r2b 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer’s Profit Manufacturer’s Profit 
 
Data Predicted p-value Data Predicted p-value Data Predicted p-value 
Mean 126 129  7073 7948  12013 13322  
Median 124 132 0.069 7263 8062 0.259 10861 12462 0.061 
St.dev. 23 10  2707 1458  2702 609  
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5.3.2 Manufacturer’s Contract Parameter Decisions 
Figure 5.3.2(a)-(d) illustrates the mean values of manufacturer’s contract parameters, 
implied critical ratio and retailer’s predicted profit. Table 5.3.2 summarizes the results. 
 
We observe that the wholesale price is overall stable over time. The revenue share, 
however, has increase significantly over time, leading to a decrease in the retailer’s 
predicted profit. On average, the manufactures choose higher wholesale prices and 
much lower revenue share prices than the optimal values. This is similar to Experiment 
r1b. The chosen parameters lead to a low critical ratio, causing low stock quantities 
relative to the optimal solution. Retailer’s predicted profit comparison indicates that 
although the manufacturers reduce the attractiveness of the contracts over time, the 
contracts are still much more attractive than the ones in the optimal solution. This leads 
to a more equitable sharing of profits between the firms.   
 
 
 
Table 5.3.2: Contract Parameters in Experiment r2b 
 
Wholesale 
Price 
(Data) 
Revenue Share 
Price 
(Data) 
Critical 
Ratio 
Retailer’s Predicted 
Profit 
Mfg. Optimal 1 246 0.75 333 
Mean 104 57 0.46 7948 
Median 104 56 0.48 8062 
Stdev 8 12 0.05 1458 
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Figure 5.3.2 (a)-(d) Contract Parameters, Critical Ratio and Retailer’s Predicted Profit                       
in Experiment r2b 
 
 
5.3.3  Changes in Decisions over Time 
Here we aim to understand if the subjects’ decisions change over periods. In Table 
5.3.3, we present the subjects’ mean decisions and profits in three period blocks 
consisting of periods 1-10, periods 11-20, and periods 21-30. To test for statistical 
significance, we compare the data of the first 10 periods with the last 10 periods.  
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Table 5.3.3   Mean Values in Three Period Blocks in Experiment r2b 
 
Stock Quantity Retailer Profit Mfg. Profit w r 
Critical 
Ratio 
Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Pred. Data Data Data 
Per. 1-10 119 134 7425 8960 10183 11806 105 45 0.49 
Per. 11-20 117 134 6410 8444 10731 12311 100 57 0.49 
Per. 21-30 144 120 6584 6441 15126 12850 108 67 0.41 
p-value 0.001 
 
0.676 
 
0.000 
 
0.171 0.238 0.000 
 
 
We observe that the retailers understocked in the initial periods leading to quite poor 
profits. In the last periods, the retailers overstocked on average. However, this benefited 
the manufacturers as attractiveness of the contracts also decreased.  
 
We observe no significant change in wholesale price, revenue share price, and retailer 
profit from the first ten periods to the last ten periods. However, manufacturer’s profit 
increases significantly. This is not surprising given that the manufacturer’s profit 
depends not only on the contract parameters, but also on the retailer’s stock quantity 
decision. Although not significant, the decrease in retailer’s predicted profit indicates 
that the manufacturer offers more aggressive contract terms in the last periods.  
 
 
5.3.4  Rejected Contracts  
The following table summarizes the data of the game in which the retailer rejected the 
contract. The rejection is likely to be caused by the relatively low profit share of the 
retailer.  
Table 5.3.4 Rejected Contracts with Predicted Results in Experiment r2b 
Period of 
Rejection 
Retailer 
Number 
w r Q* 
Mfg's Predicted 
Profit 
Retailer's 
Predicted Profit 
5 8 190 0 86 11,984 3,745 
 
 
We observe that rejection rate is lower in short run experiments than long run 
experiments. This may be due to the one short interaction logic, retailers do not want to 
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sacrifice any profit by rejecting a contract that is proposed by an unknown 
manufacturer. In the long-run experiments, the retailer may reject a contract with the 
hope of receiving more favorable contracts in subsequent periods. In short-run 
interactions, there is no such motive because the pairs keep changing every period.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
6. FEATURE SELECTION AND CLASSIFICATION  
So far, we have observed that the retailers deviate from the optimal newsvendor stock 
quantity decision. In this chapter, we aim to understand the factors that affect retailer’s 
decision. We use the data of buyback contract short-run experiments, namely b2a and 
b2b which contain 16 manufacturer-retailer pairs. Recall that these experiments were 
conducted previously and reported in Sahin and Kaya (2011). We use subject-level data 
because averages may be misleading. First, to identify the most important factors, we 
apply  “feature selection” methodology to data. Then, we build regression models to 
capture the relationship between the stock quantity decisions and the selected attributes. 
 
6.1. Feature  Selection 
Feature selection is the process of selecting a subset of relevant features to use in model 
construction. Feature selection has been an active research area in statistics and data 
mining. The central assumption when using a feature selection technique is that the data 
contains many redundant or irrelevant features. The objective of feature selection is 
three-fold: Improving the prediction performance of the predictors, providing faster and 
more cost-effective predictors, and providing a better understanding of the underlying 
process that generated the data (Guyon and Elisseeff 2003). 
 
We apply feature selection to each individual retailer’s quantity decisions, and try to 
figure out which attributes are effective the decision making process. We use the 
machine learning software Weka, which contains a collection of visualization tools and 
algorithms for data analysis and predictive modeling, together with graphical user 
interfaces for easy access to this functionality. We chose the stock quantity as the 
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“output”, and  nine “attributes” that can potentially affect the stock quantity decision as 
shown in Table 6.1.1 
 
Table 6.1.1 Output Variable and Attributes 
Output Attribute No Attribute Name Abbreviation 
St
o
ck
 Q
u
an
ti
ty
 
1 Period period 
2 Cost of Underage cu 
3 Cost Of Overage co 
4 Manufacturer Realized Profit mfgd 
5 Manufacturer Expected Profit mfge 
6 Past Demand Realization pdr 
7 Retailer Realized Profit rd 
8 Retailer Expected Profit re 
9 Retailer Profit Share profitshare 
 
 
Period refers to the phases of 30 period decisions. We assign number 1 for the first ten 
periods’ decision, 2 for the next ten periods’ decision, and 3 for the last ten periods. Past 
demand realization, Manufacturer realized profit and Retailer realized profit and 
Retailer’s profit share refer to the relevant values in the previous period. Manufacturer 
expected profit and Retailer expected profit are the expected gains of the players in the 
current round given the stock quantity. Cost of underage and overage are used instead of 
the contract parameters wholesale price and buyback price. To avoid collinearity, we 
chose not to use total profit (sum of manufacturer and retailer profit), and critical 
fractile (because it is a linear function of contract parameters w and b).  
 
In Weka software, RelieffAttributeEval was used with the ranker search method. 
RelieffAttributeEval method evaluates the value of an attribute by repeatedly sampling 
an instance and considering the value of the given attribute for the nearest instance of 
the same and different class. This method operates on both discrete and continuous class 
data. In ranker method, all attributes are ranked starting from the most important one to 
the least important one. Cross validation is selected as the Attribute Selection Method.  
We applied the same method to all 16 retailer’s decisions and we recorded each 
retailer’s five most important features. We assign weights to the attributes such as 5 if 
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the attribute is the most important one and 1 if it is the last one important. Then, we 
calculated each attribute’s weighted sum, and we rank the first five attributes that are 
most effective in making decisions. The results are shown in Table 6.1.2 and Table 
6.1.3. 
 
Table 6.1.2: The Most Important 5 Attributes Selected by b2b Retailers 
Experiment Retailer Selected Att. 1 Selected Att. 2 Selected Att. 3 Selected Att. 4 Selected Att. 5 
b2b 8 co mfge rd period profitshare 
b2b 9 co cu re mfge period 
b2b 10 co mfge re period pdr 
b2b 11 co re cu mfge mfgd 
b2b 12 period co mfge mfgd profitshare 
b2b 14 co mfge re cu profitshare 
b2b 15 co mfge re cu pdr 
 
Table 6.1.3: The Most Important 5 Attributes Selected by b2a Retailers 
Experiment Retailer Selected Att. 1 Selected Att. 2 Selected Att. 3 Selected Att. 4 Selected Att. 5 
b2a 8 mfgd period pdr co profitshare 
b2a 9 co re cu mfge profitshare 
b2a 10 co re cu pdr mfge 
b2a 11 mfgd pdr rd profitshare cu 
b2a 12 co profitshare mfge re cu 
b2a 13 mfgd period pdr co profitshare 
b2a 14 co mfgd re pdr mfge 
 
 
Table  6.1.4 Weighted Sum of Each  Attribute in Experiments b2b and b2a 
Experiment Attribute Weighed Sum Experiment Attribute Weighed Sum 
b2b co 34 b2a co 29 
b2b mfge 23 b2a mfgd 19 
b2b re 16 b2a re 17 
b2b cu 11 b2a pdr 14 
b2b period 10 b2a mfge 10 
b2b rd 3 b2a cu 10 
b2b profitshare 3 b2a profitshare 9 
b2b mfgd 3 b2a period 8 
b2b pdr 2 b2a rd 4 
 
60 
 
 
Weighted sum of each Selected Attribute in the two experiments are shown in Table  
6.1.4. For Experiment b2b we see that cost of overage is the most important attribute 
that affects the retailer decision. The other important attributes include Manufacturer’s 
expected profit, Retailer’s expected profit, Cost of underage and Period. As illustrated 
in the table, four of the top five attributes for experiment b2a are similar to the ones 
found in the top five of experiment b2b. 
 
The reason why cost of overage is the most important attribute in both experiments 
might be risk aversion of the retailer. Buyback price is generally far less than the 
wholesale price in proposed contracts. Because demand is probabilistic, retailers avoid 
taking high risk and hence, cost of overage becomes the most important factor affecting 
their stock quantity decision. Expected profits of both sides might be important due to 
the fairness concerns. If manufacturer’s expected profit is much higher in a given 
contract, retailer will not be willing to order high quantities. We observe that cost of 
underage is also important but not as much as the cost of overage.  
  
6.2. Classification  
The next step after feature selection is classification. Classification takes a data set with 
known output values and uses this data set to build a model. We apply linear regression 
to classify the data in Minitab software. The output is retailer’s order quantity decision, 
and the selected five attributes are the independent variables of the regression model. 
We hope to build more accurate regression models as we exclude the redundant 
attributes identified in the feature selection phase.  
Recall that selected five attributes for Experiment b2b are cost of overage, 
manufacturer’s expected profit, retailer’s expected profit, cost of underage and period. 
We expect stock quantity to be  increasing in the retailer’s expected profit, cost of 
underage and period; and decreasing in the cost of overage and manufacturer’s expected 
profit attributes. We expect stock quantity to be increasing with the period due to the 
learning effect. We expect decision makers to understand the logic of the game, and 
start ordering higher stock quantities. Minitab results for each individual retailer are 
shown below in  Table 6.2.1. 
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Table 6.2.1 Regression Equations for Each Retailer in Experiment b2b 
Retailer R2 
Adjusted 
R2 
p 
value 
Regression Equation  
1 0.528 0.415 0.005 Q = 294 – 1.38 co – 0.00158 mfge – 0.0147 re + 1.55 cu – 12.9 p 
2 0.708 0.644 0.000 Q = - 487 + 0.989 co + 0.0337 mfge + 0.0486 re – 2.62 cu – 9.84 p 
3 0.480 0.367 0.007 Q = - 79 + 0.35 co + 0.0086 mfge + 0.0531 re – 3.68 cu – 3.4 p 
4 0.549 0.450 0.002 Q = - 794 + 2.49 co + 0.0442 mfge + 0.102 re – 7.33 cu – 3.84 p 
5 0.366 0.229 0.049 Q = - 795 + 2.06 co + 0.0411 mfge + 0.0704 re – 4.50 cu + 22.4 p 
7 0.822 0.783 0.000 Q = 97 – 0.028 co + 0.0022 mfge + 0.0348 re – 3.15 cu + 6.29 p 
8 0.543 0.444 0.002 Q = - 263 + 1.64 co + 0.0150 mfge + 0.0865 re – 7.45 cu + 9.03 p 
 
 
The regression equations are significant and R-squared values seem high. However, 
most of the factors in regression equations were not found to be significant even at 10% 
level. Significant factors in equations are shown with bold fonts in Table 6.2.1. The 
signs of the beta coefficients in regression equations usually follow our predictions. For 
example, cost of overage usually has a negative sign, whereas cost of underage has 
positive. Retailer’s expected profit has positive sign. Interestingly, manufacturer’s 
expected profit sign is also positive for most retailers. The retailers seem to care 
positively about the manufacturer’s profit as well.  
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Table 6.2.2. Regression Equation for Each Retailer in b2a Experiment 
Retailer R2 
Adjusted 
R2 
p 
value 
Regression Equation 
1 0.448 0.297 0.028 
Q = 716 – 3.22 co – 0.00278 mfgd – 0.0914 re + 0.354 pdr + 8.42 cu – 
0.0242 mfge 
2 0.853 0.812 0.000 
Q = - 174 + 0.468 co – 0.00054 mfgd + 0.0417 re – 0.0303 pdr – 2.91 cu 
+ 0.0167 mfge 
3 0.846 0.804 0.000 
Q = - 1141 + 3.07 co + 0.00110 mfgd + 0.111 re + 0.0359 pdr – 7.50 cu 
+ 0.0585 mfge 
4 0.690 0.605 0.000 
Q = - 88 – 0.02 co + 0.00524 mfgd – 0.0033 re + 0.154 pdr + 1.11 cu + 
0.0048 mfge 
5 0.950 0.937 0.000 
Q = - 384 + 1.10 co – 0.000433 mfgd + 0.0597 re – 0.0001 pdr               
–  4.28 cu + 0.0263 mfge 
6 0.198 0.000 0.507 
Q = 1175 – 3.41 co + 0.00117 mfgd – 0.106 re + 0.166 pdr + 7.79 cu – 
0.0486 mfge 
7 0.541 0.416 0.005 
Q = - 1568 + 3.95 co – 0.00185 mfgd + 0.153 re + 0.118 pdr – 10.3 cu + 
0.0819 mfge 
8 0.719 0.642 0.000 
Q = 348 – 0.16 co + 0.00139 mfgd + 0.0125 re + 0.0418 pdr – 2.35 cu- 
0.0081 mfge 
 
 
Next, we develop regression models on “pooled” data for each experiment.  We convert 
each retailer number into nominal value such as p1 for Retailer-1. Results are shown in  
Table 6.2.3. 
 
Table 6.2.3 Regression Equations of  Pooled Data for Each Experiment 
Experiment R2 
Adjusted 
R2 
p value Regression Equation for each experiment 
b2a 0.485 0.458 0.000 
Q = 46.0 – 0.402 co + 0.000261 mfgd + 0.00625 re 
+ 0.00631 mfge – 0.30 p2 – 11.8 p3 + 9.20 p4 + 
0.49 p5 – 14.4 p7 + 5.67 p8 
b2b 0.425 0.394 0.000 
Q = 186 – 0.672 co – 0.00105 mfge + 
0.00016 re + 0.387 cu + 13.9 p2 – 15.0 p3 
+ 7.2 p4 – 21.8 p5 – 17.5 p7 – 26.7 p8 
 
 
In b2a experiment, the regression is significant but only the cost of overage and 
retailer’s expected profit are significantly important. None of the individual retailer 
variables were found to be significant. Similarly, in Experiment b2b, we obtain a 
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significant regression, but only the cost of overage and Retailer-15 are the significant 
attributes.  
 
Based on these observations, we conclude that although it is reasonable to apply 
regression, we could not find a strong evidence between the attributes and the stock 
quantity decision.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
7. FAIRNESS CONCERNS 
Research in behavioral economics in the past two decades has shown that there is a 
significant incidence of cases in which firms, like individuals are motivated by concerns 
of fairness in business relationships, including channel relationships. Many studies have 
shown that fairness concern plays an important role in channel coordination. 
Manufacturers and retailers could forgo their profit margins when they care about 
fairness. 
7.1. The Regression Model 
To study whether our retailers decisions were affected by fairness concerns, we develop 
multiple linear regression models on Experiment b1a data, using SPSS v17 software. 
Pooling the order quantity decisions of all six retailers, and excluding rejected contracts 
we obtain n=171 data points. Stock quantity is the dependent variable, and the four 
variables listed in Table 7.1.1 are the independent variables. 
 
Table 7.1.1: Regression Independent Variables and Descriptions 
Name Abbreviation Description 
D - Q D-Q 
Previous period absolute value of 
(demand - stock quantity) 
Mfg profit previous mfgp Manufacturer's profit of previous period 
Retailer profit previous rp Retailer's profit of previous period 
Expected retailer mfg ratio r/m 
Profit ratio of manufacturer and retailer 
in current period 
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The fourth independent variable is our fairness measure. Descriptive statistics of the 
variables for 171 observations are shown in Table 7.1.2. 
 
Table 7.1.2: Descriptive Statistics of Each Variable 
Variable Mean Std. Deviation 
Q 127 42 
D - Q 58 40 
Mfg profit previous 13,844 5,727 
Retailer profit previous 5,213 6,658 
Expected ret mfg ratio 0.497 0.445 
 
We run multiple linear regression using SPSS 17.0 and we test the null hypothesis that 
claims there is no relationship between retailer’s stock quantity decision and the 
independent variables. Results are shown in Table 7.1.3. 
 
Table 7.1.3: Multiple Linear Regression Results 
R
2
 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
P value Equation 
0.246 0.228 0.000 
Q(t) = 59.218  + 0.167(D-Q) + 
0.002(mfgp) + 0.001(rp) + 
41.522(r/m) 
 
The F test p value shows that the regression equation is significant. The R-square value 
indicates that  24.6 % of the variability in the stock quantity decisions can be explained 
by the independent variables. All independent variables are statistically significant in 
explaining the deviations in dependent variable. We expect (D-Q)’s beta value to be 
positive; the increase in difference between demand and stock quantity decision should 
affect stock quantity decision positively. We expect retailer’s previous period realized 
profit and retailer’s profit share of the current period to affect stock quantity decision 
positively. We observe that the signs of the beta coefficients are all positive in our 
regression model, which is line with our expectations.  
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7.2.  Diagnostics and Remedial for Residuals 
There are three assumptions in multiple regression model. First, there must be a linear 
relationship between dependent variable and all independent variables. Second, the error 
term has constant variance with mean zero. Third, the error term is normally distributed. 
To test linearity and constant variance assumption of residuals, we look at the matrix 
plot of the dependent variable and all independent variables, residual plots against 
independent variables and partial residual plots. By looking at the residual plot against 
independent variables, we suspect that the linearity assumption holds only in retailer 
previous profit independent variable, and the constant variance assumption might be 
violated. To check constant variance assumption, we applied Modified Levene Test 
determine which independent variables to transform. Figure 7.2.1 shows matrix plot of 
dependent variable and Figure 7.2.2 shows unstandardized residual plot for the 
independent variable D-Q. 
 
 
Figure 7.2.1: Matrix Plot of all Variables 
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 Figure 7.2.2: Unstandardized Residual plot for D-Q(t-1) 
 
We observe that linearity assumption is violated in D-Q and r/m . Hence, we transform 
these independent variables with the fourth square root of each data point. Table 7.2.1 
summarizes the change in R
2 
values after two transformations. Figure 7.2.3 (a)-(b) show 
partial regression plots of transformed predictor variables after transformation.  
 
Table 7.2.1: Transformed Predictor Variables and New R
2
 Values 
Transformed 
Pred. Variables 
Transformation R2 Adjusted R2 
D-Q 4 D-Q  0.261 0.243 
r/m 4 /r m  0.276 0.258 
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Figure 7.2.3: Partial Regression Plots of Predicted Variables after Transformation 
 
We observe that linearity assumption holds after the transformations. We applied 
Modified Levene Test to check constant variance assumption and conclude that none of 
the independent variables violate constant variance assumption. The results of Modified 
Levene Test results are shown in Appendix D. The last assumption to check is the 
normality of the error term. By checking the histogram of the standardized residuals in 
Figure 7.2.4, we conclude that error term is normally distributed.  
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Figure 7.2.4 Histogram of Regression Standardized Residuals  
 
We also test the normality of error terms through the Kolmogorov Smirnov test. As 
shown in Table 7.2.2 that normality assumption holds.  
 
Table 7.2.2: The Results of the Kolmogorov Smirnov Test 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Unstandardized Residual .060 167 .200
*
 .995 167 .853 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
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7.3. Testing for Outliers 
Since outliers have crucial effects on the data and regression equation, we try to detect 
outlying independent (X) and dependent (Y) variable observations of the data. After 
detecting outlying data, we extract them from the model and rerun multiple linear 
regression.  
 
 The studentized deleted residual is the residual that would be obtained if the regression 
was re-run omitting that observation from the analysis.  This is useful because some 
points are so influential that when they are included in the analysis they can pull the 
regression line close to that observation making it appear as though it is not an outlier, 
however when the observation is deleted, it then becomes more obvious how outlying it 
is. Studentized Deleted Residuals is used to identify cases with outlying Y observations. 
Decision rule of detecting a Y outlier is shown in Appendix E.Figure 7.3.1 shows Box 
plot of Y observations. Cases 15 , 26 , 150 , 166, 169 and 172 are found to be outliers 
and extracted them from the data.  
 
        
Figure 7.3.1: Box Plot for Extreme Y Values 
 
Hat matrix leverage values (measures of the distance between the X values and the 
mean of the X values for all n cases) is used for identifying X outliers. Decision rule of 
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detecting an X outlier is shown in Appendix E. Twelve X values are detected as outliers 
and extracted from the data. After extracting outliers from the data, we  run another 
regression with the new data set. Table 7.3.1 summarizes the results of the new 
regression equation.  
 
Table 7.3.1: Regression Results after Transformation and Extracting Outliers 
R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 p value Equation 
0.662 0.438 0.000 
Q(t) = -70.114  + 17.32Sqrt4(D-Q) + 
0.003(mfgp) + 0.002(rp) + 
128.636Sqrt4(r/m) 
 
We check normality assumptions for residuals and multicollinearity in the new 
transformed regression model. Kolmogorov Smirnov test assures that normality 
assumption holds. Variance Inflation Factor is checked and no multicollinearity was 
detected.  
 
We observe from the transformed equation that fairness concern is an important factor 
in retailer’s stock quantity decision. In fact, a 2% increase in the fairness measure (the 
ratio of retailer’s and manufacturer’s expected profits) result in a 1.2% increase in the 
stock quantity decision.  
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CHAPTER 8  
 
 
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this thesis, we compare the experimental performances of three popular supply chain 
contracts (wholesale price, buyback and revenue sharing contracts). Revenue sharing 
contract experiments were conducted as part of this thesis work, whereas wholesale 
price and buyback contract experiment data are from Sahin and Kaya (2011).  
 
We observe the decisions of both the retailer and the manufacturer players in 
experiments to deviate from the theoretical model’s predictions. In particular, the 
manufacturers offered more “attractive” contracts than predicted, while the retailers 
chose suboptimal stocking quantities in response.  
 
The simple wholesale price contract performed better than predicted in terms of total 
profits, contract efficiency and retailer profits. This is because the manufacturers offered 
more attractive contracts, and the retailers, on average, overstocked relative to 
theoretical prediction. The revenue sharing contract, on the other hand, performed 
significantly worse than predicted. In theory, the revenue sharing contract should have 
been equivalent to the buyback contract. In experiments, however the revenue sharing 
contract lead to lower manufacturer profits and total profits than the buyback contract. 
The retailer’s profit, on the other hand, is higher. Interestingly, the offered revenue 
sharing contracts were more attractive than the buyback contracts, but the retailers 
somehow responded with lower stock quantities. The “framing difference” between the 
two contracts is likely to be the explanation. The retailers may prefer a buyback contract 
to an equivalent revenue sharing contract because the buyback contract emphasizes 
safety (manufacturer buying back unsold units), whereas the revenue sharing contract 
emphasizes share of sales revenue (some portion of revenue going to the manufacturer). 
Likewise, there was no significant difference between the attractiveness of the revenue 
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sharing and wholesale price contracts, but the latter resulted in much higher 
manufacturer profits and total profits. These findings raise questions about the practical 
usefulness of the revenue sharing contracts.  
 
For all contract types, we observe the manufacturers to offer more attractive contracts 
than predicted. Fairness concerns (see Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) of the subjects is 
likely to be an effective factor here. Recall that the manufacturer has the power to offer 
the contract terms, but the retailer has the power to reject the contract. This “ultimatum 
structure” (see Camerer 2003) causes the manufacturer to consider retailer’s reaction. 
The fear of contract rejection is likely to cause the manufacturers to offer more fair 
contracts that offer more equitable sharing of expected profits than theoretical 
prediction. In fact, our multiple linear regression study show that the fairness factor is 
important in the retailer’s stock quantity decision.  
 
We also studied the effects of relationship length. We expected the manufacturers to 
offer more attractive contracts and retailers to stock higher quantities in long-run 
relationship (the same manufacturer-retailer pair in all periods) experiments than in the 
short-run relationship (manufacturer-retailer pairs re-determined in each period) 
experiments. Surprisingly, we observed the opposite. Manufacturers are likely to offer 
more attractive contracts in the short-run relationships because they fear that the 
“unknown” retailer they face may reject the contract. In the long-run relationships, the 
manufacturer learns about the limits of the retailer and can be more confident in offering 
in less attractive contracts. Likewise, long-run relationships encourage “gaming” 
between the firms. The retailers may reject contracts or set low stock quantity values to 
show to the manufacturers that they are tough players, hoping that they will receive 
more attractive contract offers in following periods. In the end, the manufacturers 
offered more attractive contracts, and the retailers responded with higher quantity values 
in the short run relationships. Although not significantly different, the total profits, 
manufacturer profits and retailer profits are also  higher in the short run relationships.    
 
We observe high individuality in the data. Human subjects’ decisions in experiments 
exhibit wide variation. In particular, some subjects were understocking while some 
others were seriously overstocking within the same revenue sharing experiment session. 
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Similar to other works in literature (see the discussions in Bolton and Katok 2008, and 
Becker-Peth, Katok and Thonemann 2009), some of our results are based on average 
decisions. While such results are helpful in outlining the expected behavior, one should 
not underestimate the variability around these expected values when predicting human 
behavior.  
 
We apply feature selection and classification techniques to the buyback contract 
experiments to figure out if subjects determine their stock quantity decision in the light 
of some attributes. Out of nine candidates, we determine the most important five 
attributes as cost of overage, manufacturer’s expected profit, retailer’s expected profit, 
cost of underage and period number. We then build a regression model separately for 
each individual where stock quantity is the dependent variable and these five attributes 
are the independent variables. While the regression equations are significant, R-squared 
values are acceptable, and beta coefficient have predicted signs, most of the attributes 
are not found to be significant for most individuals.  
 
This work can be extended in a number of directions. One possibility is to conduct 
experiments on other supply chain contract types, such as quantity discount contract and 
rebate contract, and present a more complete comparison. Another important extension 
would be to develop behavioral models to explain the subject decisions observed in our 
experiments. One can create regression models that consider, for example, risk aversion, 
loss aversion, or bounded rationality  of the subjects. Yet another possibility is to allow 
negotiations between the firms, rather than considering “take-it-or-leave-it” contracts.  
 
Despite the presence of advanced IT systems, it is the human managers that make 
contractual decisions in companies.  Hence, an understanding of human biases related to 
contracting decisions is valuable for practice. In this respect, this thesis makes a number 
of managerial contributions. First, the simple wholesale price contract performs as good 
as the buyback contract, and much better than the revenue sharing contract. Second, 
human beings seem to care not only about their expected profits, but also about how this 
expected profit is distributed, i.e., fairness. Third, short –run relationships between firms 
may be preferable to long-run ones, because long-run relationships can be damaged by 
strategic moves.  
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Appendix B  Instructions for Revenue Sharing Contract Experiments with Short 
Run Relationship 
 
Instructions for Revenue Sharing Contract Experiments 
May/June 2013 
 
 
Scenario 
We consider a manufacturer who produces a certain product, and a retailer who buys the 
product from the manufacturer and sells it to consumers. Consumer demand is 
uncertain. It is a random number distributed uniformly between 40 and 230. That is, 
there is a 1/191 chance that demand will be equal to any of the integers between 40 and 
230.  The following figure illustrates the flow of money in the supply chain. 
 
 
p 
 
 
 
We consider a three-stage game between the manufacturer and the retailer: 
 
Stage-1: The manufacturer determines the two contract parameters, and offers the 
contract to the retailer: 
 Wholesale price, w. This is the price at which the manufacturer sells his product 
to the retailer. The wholesale price has to be an integer less than the retail price 
250. Retail price is the price at which the retailer sells the product to consumers. 
 Revenue share, r: The manufacturer will receive a revenue share of r  for each 
unit that the retailer sells to consumers. The retailer will keep the rest of the 
revenue, which is 250-r.  The amount 250-r  should be higher than the wholesale 
price w, otherwise the retailer will lose money for every unit sold. Hence, the 
manufacturer’s revenue share  r  should satisfy  0 250r w   . 
 
Stage-2: The retailer observes the wholesale price and revenue share offers of the 
manufacturer, and determines his stock quantity, Q for the product. The retailer may 
Retailer Consumer Demand 
~UNIFORM (40,230) 
 
Manufacturer 
w 
Stock quantity: Q 
250-r 
Unit production cost:50 
Revenue share: r 
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reject the manufacturer’s offer by setting Q=0. In this case, both firms earn zero profit. 
Otherwise, the retailer orders Q products from the manufacturer. The manufacturer 
produces this order by incurring the unit production cost 50 per product, and delivers 
them to the retailer. The retailer stocks these products prior to the selling season. 
Because consumer demand can be between 40 and 230, the retailer’s stock quantity Q 
decision also has to be between these values (if it is not equal to zero). 
 
Stage-3: Random consumer demand is determined as “d”. Using his stock of product, 
the retailer satisfies this demand as much as possible. The sales quantity of the retailer 
is the minimum of stock quantity and the realized demand. For each unit sold, the 
manufacturer gets  r  dollars and the retailer keeps 250-r. Two cases are possible: 
 If demand is higher than retailer’s stock quantity (i.e., d>Q), then retailer will 
sell all Q units, and (d-Q) units of demand will be unsatisfied  (unsatisfied 
demand). 
 If demand is less than the retailer’s stock quantity, (i.e., d<Q), then the retailer 
will sell d units, and (Q-d) products will be unsold (leftover products). These 
products have zero value. 
 
Each firm aims to maximize its payoff  (or, profit) in the game. 
 
The retailer’s payoff is calculated as the retail price times the sales quantity, minus the 
wholesale payment to the manufacturer, minus the manufacturer’s revenue share 
payment. 
That is,   𝟐𝟓𝟎 ∗ 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔   –    𝒘 ∗ 𝑸  −   𝒓 ∗ 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔. 
 
The manufacturer’s payoff is calculated as the wholesale payment received from the 
retailer, minus the production cost, plus the revenue share payment from the retailer. 
That is, 𝒘 ∗ 𝑸  −   𝟓𝟎 ∗ 𝑸  +   𝒓 ∗ 𝒔𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔. 
 
Note that there are three decisions in the game: The manufacturer determines the 
contract parameters w and r ; afterwards, the retailer determines his stock quantity Q. 
Both firms’ decisions affect the payoff of both firms. 
 
 
Preparation for Our Experiments 
 The experiments will take place at the CAFÉ computer lab at the G-floor of the 
FMAN building. 
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 Please come to the experiments on-time so that we can start and finish on time. 
 You will play a pilot experiment to solidify your understanding of the software. 
 Please do not open any other program, including other browser windows, during the 
experiments. 
 Please enter integer values for all decisions, and pay attention to the data entry rules. 
 
 
Our Experiment 
 
 In the experiments, you will play the role of either a manufacturer or a retailer for a 
number of periods. Your role will be fixed in all periods of an experiment. In each 
period, the server will  randomly match each manufacturer with a retailer. That is, 
you will be (most likely) playing with different opponents at each period. 
 The periods are independent of each other. A large or small demand realization in a 
period does not affect the demand in the later periods. Leftover products cannot be 
used to satisfy demand in following periods. Only your payoff will accumulate over 
time. 
 
 
A Sample Screenshot: The following figure illustrates how the retailer’s screen will 
look like at stage 2: 
 
 
Figure 0.1: Retailer’s screen at stage 2 
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 The large table in the middle of the screen is your decision support tool (to be 
explained). 
 The yellow box on the upper left presents general information including the period 
number, the wholesale price and revenue share that the manufacturer set at stage 1. 
 The blue box in the upper right presents information on the last period. 
 The pink box in the bottom is where you submit your decision to the server. You 
enter your decision value into the related gray box, hit “enter” and then click on the 
green “Submit” button at the bottom (that will be visible during experiment). Note 
that the submit button will be activated only after you enter a valid decision and hit 
enter (or, click somewhere in the screen). Invalid entries will cause warnings. 
 The cells in which you can enter values are labeled with “gray” background. 
 You can check the results of previous periods by clicking the Historical Results tab 
in the bottom of the screen. This will open a second worksheet with the titles seen 
below (for manufacturer): 
 
 
Figure 0.2: Historical results table (manufacturer) 
 
 
The Decision Support Tool 
Before you submit a decision, you can use the  decision support tool that is in the 
middle of the screen. This tool allows you to calculate the outcome for certain values of 
your decision, the other firm’s decision, and for specific realizations of the consumer 
demand. Note that the values you enter in this area are only for your temporary 
calculations. The only value that we record is the one you submit in the “stock 
quantity” box at the bottom of the screen. 
 
Retailer’s decision support tool at stage-1 
You may enter a “stock quantity” value in the top gray cell. To help you visualize the 
possible outcomes if you really set this stock quantity, the table summarizes the 
outcome for different consumer demand realizations (d=40, 60, …, 230) each in a row. 
 
In the example in Figure 1, the retailer’s stock quantity is entered as 120. We observe 
from the table that if consumer demand turns out to be, for example, 80, you (retailer) 
will sell 80 units because the demand is smaller than the stock quantity. Your leftover 
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inventory will be 120-80=40 units. Since you satisfied all consumer demand, there will 
be no unsatisfied consumer demand. The manufacturer’s share of the sales revenue will 
be 40*80=3200 dollars; whereas your share of the revenue will be (250-40)*80=16800 
dollars. 
 
Compare this with the outcome if consumer demand turns out to be 140. In this case, 
you (the retailer) will sell all of your 120 units, and there will be zero leftover inventory.  
Unsatisfied demand will be 140-120=20. The manufacturer’s share of the sales revenue 
will be 40*120=4800 dollars; whereas your share of the revenue will be (250-
40)*120=25200 dollars. 
Manufacturer’s decision support tool at stage-1 
 
At stage-1, you (the manufacturer) will submit your wholesale price and revenue share 
decisions. However, in order to use the decision support tool, you also need to guess 
what stock quantity the retailer might determine at stage 2. Figure 3 below illustrates 
what the outcome will be if you set 100 as your wholesale price, 40 as your revenue 
share, and if the retailer sets 120 as his stock quantity (i.e., if he orders 120 products 
from you). 
 
 
Figure 0.3:   Manufacturer’s decision support tool at Stage 1. 
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Appendix C  Mean Differences Between the Experiments with Null Orders and 
Without Null Orders 
 
Table 0.1 Mean Differences Between the Experiments with Null Orders and without 
Null Orders in Revenue Sharing Contracts 
 
  
With Null Orders Without Null Orders 
  
w r Q Mfg.Prof. Ret.Prof. w r Q Mfg.Prof. Ret.Prof. 
  Predicted 1 246 183 22,784 333 1 246 183 22,784 333 
Exp. # of rej.  Data Data Data Data Data Data Data Data Data Data 
r1a 13 118 47 91 9,133 6,445 117 46 102 10,100 7,122 
r1b 24 102 71 95 9,600 4,700 103 67 108 11,224 4,978 
r2a 2 79 91 128 11,746 6,438 80 90 129 11,850 6,506 
r2b 1 104 56 126 11,950 6,778 104 56 127 12,013 7,073 
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Appendix D Modified Levene Test Results 
The steps of applied Modified Levene test is as follows:  
 Partition the data roughly into two groups (1- 88 and 89 - 174 ). 
 
 Obtain the residuals from the regression, and split the residuals of two groups. In 
this case, both groups have 87 observations.  
 
 Obtain the median residual of each group 
 
 Obtain the absolute deviation of each residual from its respective gropu median 
residual. 
 
 Then, one tests the equality of the two means of the absolute deviation, by the 
standart t test for two independent means. If the two group mean absolute 
deviations are statistically unequal, then the residuals in one sside of the X range 
has larger variability than the other side.  
 
 Hypothesis are:  
 
H0 = Constant variance 
HA   = Not true 
 
Reject  H0  when p value < . 
Modified Levene Test for X1, Sqrt4D-Q 
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Table 0.1Results of Modified Levene Test for transformed X1: SqrtD-Q 
  Variable 1 
Variable 
2 
Mean 25,99346861 27,68033 
Variance 593,5766686 545,8681 
Observations 87 87 
Pooled Variance 569,7223705 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 172 
 t Stat -0,46611473 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,320861566 
 t Critical one-tail 1,65376095 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,641723133 
 t Critical two-tail 1,97385213   
 
Since t Stat < t Critical two tail, we can not reject null hypothesis, constant variance 
assumption is not violated. 
Table 0.2:Modified levene test for X2 : Manufacturer’s previous realized Profit 
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 25,6629055 28,02395659 
Variance 576,3682553 553,7694318 
Observations 87 87 
Pooled Variance 565,0688435 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 172 
 
t Stat 
-
0,655087532 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,256643273 
 t Critical one-tail 1,65376095 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,513286546 
 t Critical two-tail 1,97385213   
 
Since t Stat < t Critical two tail, we can not reject null hypothesis, constant variance 
assumption is not violated. 
Table 0.3:Results of Modified Levene Test for Retailers previous profit realization 
  
Variable 
1 
Variable 
2 
Mean 29,40327 24,26042 
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Variance 737,6114 389,7561 
Observations 87 87 
Pooled Variance 563,6838 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 172 
 t Stat 1,428668 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,077457 
 t Critical one-tail 1,653761 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,154913 
 t Critical two-tail 1,973852   
 
Since t Stat < t Critical two tail, we can not reject null hypothesis, constant variance 
assumption is not violated. 
Table 0.4: Results of Modified Levene Test  for SQRT4 fairness concern (expected ratio 
of retailer profit over manufacturer profit) 
  Variable 1 Variable 2 
Mean 26,7983549 26,87076 
Variance 543,8146663 583,2371 
Observations 87 87 
Pooled Variance 563,5258775 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 172 
 t Stat -0,020117492 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,491986482 
 t Critical one-tail 1,65376095 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,983972964 
 t Critical two-tail 1,97385213   
 
Since t Stat < t Critical two tail, we can not reject null hypothesis, constant variance 
assumption is not violated.  
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Appendix E Decision Rule for Detecting Outliers 
 
Outlying Y observations 
Studentized Deleted Residuals is used to identify cases with outlying observations. 
Decision Rule:  
Studentized Deleted Residual > t ( 1- /2n ; n – p – 1)  the case is outlier.  
n : 174 , p = 5  = 0.05  
Studentized Deleted Residual > t ( 1- 0.05 / 348 ; 168) > t ( 0.0027 ; 168 ) = 3.15  
Case 15 , 26 , 150 , 166, 169 and172 are outliers. 
  
Outlying X observations 
Hat matrix leverage values which are the measures of the distance between the X values 
and the mean of the X values for all n case is used for identifying X outliers.  
Leverage values > 2p / n, the case is outlier.  
2p / n = 0.05747    ( see related excel sheet) 
12  X values detected as outliers. 
 
 
